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Abstract  
This thesis employs discourse analysis to examine the 
human rights contradictions contained in the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS).  It follows the development 
of the CEAS since its inception in 1999.  However, the 
principal emphasis of the thesis falls on the scope for realising 
a rights-based asylum regime in the post-Lisbon context. 
The research takes the form of policy analysis, and is 
grounded in a human rights framework of inquiry.  This human 
rights perspective is used to examine the normative and legal 
inconsistencies inherent to the EU’s securitised approach to 
asylum, and to put forward suggestions for an approach to 
asylum in the EU, which engenders a rights-based approach to 
protection.  The analysis of contemporary EU asylum policy 
and practice demonstrates the extent to which securitisation is 
present in EU asylum policymaking.  It shows that, until the 
security paradigm in this policy area is supplanted, the 
realisation of a rights-based asylum system in the EU will not 
be possible.  It also addresses the further challenges to the 
realisation of the EU as a ‘single asylum space,’ which stem 
from the limitations in the current instruments of the acquis, 
most notably the absence of burden-sharing mechanisms to 
ensure that the EU’s humanitarian obligations are shared 
equally amongst Member States.  The recent ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon holds significant potential for the 
development of a rights-based asylum regime in the EU.  
However, it remains in question whether Member States have 
the political will necessary to accomplish this. 
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1 
Introduction 
The international refugee regime is in crisis.  The total refugee population of 
10.4 million is vastly greater than the number of protection places available.  The 
problem has grown more pronounced in recent years as elevated concerns about 
terrorism, state security, and economic recession have substantially weakened the 
ideological value of refugee protection, which is enshrined in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.1  This has precipitated the development of elaborate policies of 
deterrence and deflection in Western liberal democratic states, which serve to limit 
the scope of their protection obligations at international law.2  The highly 
interconnected global landscape allows for an extensive network of readmission 
agreements, which, coupled with the development of sophisticated border control 
technology, allow Western states an unparalleled capacity to deflect refugee 
movements from their territories.3  These widespread practices have greatly reduced 
the global asylum space.  The lack of avenues to protection leave two thirds of the 
world’s refugees trapped in situations of protracted exile, with no immediate hope of 
being granted asylum.4  The prevalence of these restrictive practices in the global 
North has also amplified the asymmetrical geography of the international protection 
landscape.5 80% of refugees are currently supported in developing countries.6  
                                                
1 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees hereafter the Refugee Convention. 189 UNTS150, 
entered into force on 22 April 1954. 
2 Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
2. 
3 Alexander Betts, “The Refugee Regime Complex,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 29(1) (2010): 26. 
4 UNHCR defines a protracted situation as a situation where 25 000 or more individuals of a particular 
nationality have been in exile for more than five years in a particular country.  
UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced and Stateless 
Persons,” accessed 30 November, 2010,  
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ.../UNHCR_Jun2010.pdf.   
5 Ninette Kelley, “International Refugee Protection: Challenges and Opportunities,” International 
Journal of Refugee Law 19(3) (2007): 404. 
6 UNHCR, “2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced and Stateless 
Persons,” 2. 
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The European Union’s creation of a supranational asylum regime has been at 
the vanguard of this restrictive trend.  In 2009, EU Member States granted 
international protection to 78, 800 refugees.7  This figure corresponds to less than one 
asylum seeker per 2,200 European citizens.8  The EU in fact possesses the means and 
the capacity to create a rights-based protection regime, which would provide long-
term refugee protection to those refugees who claim international protection within 
the European Union.9  Yet, against a rhetorical commitment to the ideological value 
of the Refugee Convention, the EU and its Member States have pioneered a range of 
policy innovations to limit their protection responsibilities.  This practice has 
substantially weakened the ideological value of asylum and ultimately threatens to 
undermine the global institution of refugee protection.10 
This thesis explores the development of the EU’s common asylum policy, since 
its genesis in 1999.  It considers the impact of the EU’s counter terrorism response on 
the development of the EU as an asylum space.  The ensuing proliferation of security 
tools, which have heavily focussed on strengthening controls at the EU’s external 
border and enhancing information-sharing and surveillance practices, have 
specifically targeted and excluded asylum seekers.11 However, the primary focus falls 
on the scope for realising a rights-based asylum regime in the post-Lisbon context. 
                                                
7 Eurostat News Release: “Asylum decisions in the EU27: EU Member States Granted Protection to 78 
800 asylum seekers in 2009,” accessed 27 June 2010,  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-18062010-AP/EN/3-18062010-AP-EN.PDF.  
8 Eiko Thielemann, Richard Williams and Christina Boswell, “What System of burden-sharing between 
Member States for the reception of asylum seekers?” (Study, Directorate General for Internal Policies), 
accessed 30 November 2010, www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do.,159, 
12. 
9 Madeleine Garlick, “The EU Discussions on Extraterritorial Processing: Solution or Conundrum?,” 
International Journal of Refugee Law 18(3-4) (2006): 615. 
10 Emek M Uçarer, “Burden-Shirking, Burden-Shifting, and Burden-Sharing in the Emergent European 
Asylum Regime” International Politics.  43 (2) (2006): 219. 
11 Elspeth Guild, “International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Borders Policy: The 
Unexpected Victims of 11 September 2001,” European Foreign Affairs Review 8(2003): 334. 
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The number of refugees in the EU has dramatically decreased since Member 
States embarked on the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).12 
This does not reflect a reduction in asylum seekers wishing to access the EU; it is 
evidence of the efficacy of the EU’s arsenal of extraterritorial controls, which make it 
virtually impossible for refugees to lawfully enter EU territory.13  The indiscriminate 
use of pre-frontier patrols, carrier sanctions, stringent visa requirements, as well as 
restrictions on legal access, force refugees into irregular patterns of migration.  These 
irregular journeys are notoriously perilous.  An unknown number of refugees perish 
every year in their bid to access international protection in the EU.14  
Those refugees who do gain access to EU territory may find that their claim is 
deemed ‘manifestly unfounded’ due to their provenance from a ‘safe country of 
origin,’ or because they have transited through a ‘safe third country.’15  The EU has 
established an extensive system of readmission agreements with third countries, 
which facilitate the removal of asylum seekers from its territory.  These return 
agreements have been coupled with increased support for border enforcement and 
detention capacity in neighbouring transit countries, which are effectively used to 
transfer the responsibility for refugee protection onto other states.16 The EU’s twin 
policies of non-arrival and non-admission have earned the EU the epithet of ‘Fortress 
                                                
12 In 1992, 700,000 protection seekers applied for asylum in the EU-15; in 2008 240,000-asylum 
applicants claimed protection in the EU-27.  UNHCR, “2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-
seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons,” accessed 30 November, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4a375c426&query=2008%20global%20trends. 
13 Elspeth Guild, “The Legal Framework: Who is entitled to Move?,” in Controlling Frontiers: Free 
Movement Into and Within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 35. 
14 ECRE, “Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe,” December 2007, accessed 15 
February, 2010, 
http://www.ecre.org/.../Refugees%20Access%20to%20Protection%20in%20Europe%20EX, 2. 
15 EU Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, O.J. 2005, L326/13 of 1 December 2005. 
16 Cathryn Costello, “The Asylum Procedures Directive and the Proliferation of Safe Third Country 
Practices: Deterrence, Deflection and the Dismantling of International Protection?” European Journal 
of Migration and Law 7 (2005): 45. 
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Europe.’  This is a marked departure from the rights-based approach to protection, 
which was once a defining feature of European refugee policies. 
Background to European refugee protection 
In the wake of the Second World War, Western European States were among 
the principle advocates of a liberal universalist rights-based approach to refugee 
protection.17 The signing of the Refugee Convention codified this approach to refugee 
protection in international law for the first time.  Its humanitarian approach formed 
the guiding assumption behind domestic asylum policy in Western Europe for the 
following four decades.18  
During the Cold War there were strong political motivations behind Western 
European countries accepting refugees from neighbouring communist states.  Asylum 
was only sought by a small number of individuals of predominantly European 
ethnicity.19  The 50s and 60s saw strong economic growth in Western Europe.  To fuel 
the demand for workers, immigration was actively encouraged.20   However, at the 
beginning of the 70s the oil crisis brought the economic boom to a sudden end and 
Western Europe plunged into recession.  Faced with growing unemployment and an 
increased demand on their welfare systems, Western European states introduced 
legislation to stem migration.21 This left asylum as one of the only remaining avenues 
                                                
17 Christina Boswell, European Migration Influx: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 53.  
18 Asylum is absent from the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms. This is most likely because the 1951 Convention was initially intended for use in Europe. 
See Catherine Teitgen-Colly, “The European Union and Asylum: An Illusion of Protection,” Common 
Market Law Review  43 (2006): 1504. 
19 Boswell, European Migration Influx: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, 53. 
20 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (New York: 
Routeledge, 2006), 59. 
21 Although Member States introduced policies more or less simultaneously, there was no formal 
coordination of policies between them at this stage. See Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer,  
Migration and The Externalities of the European Union (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 19. 
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of access to the West.  Would-be migrants applied instead for refugee status, 
inevitably raising questions about the legitimacy of their asylum claims.22   
The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 made access from Central and Eastern 
European countries much easier, which exacerbated Western European fears of an 
influx of asylum seekers.23  This anxiety about a deluge from the East precipitated a 
move towards protectionist policies.24 The end of the Cold War also marked a change 
in the ideological value of refugees; asylum seekers were no longer seen as victims of 
communist repression and began to be perceived pejoratively as ‘economic 
migrants.’25 Attempts to stem the increase failed.26  
By the beginning of the 1980s Western European countries began to portray the 
growing numbers of asylum seekers as an “asylum crisis.”27 In the ensuing polemic 
‘asylum seekers’ became a generic term to describe all migrants.28 Public debate 
failed to distinguish between immigrants and protection seekers, and this fuelled the 
politicisation of asylum.29 In the domestic context, media and politics began to 
challenge the commitments to asylum seekers and raise concerns about ‘bogus 
                                                
22 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, 66. 
23 Gregor Noll, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common 
Market of Deflection  (The Hague: Kluwer Law International) (2000), 119. 
24 Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 42. 
25 Arthur Helton, The Price of Indifference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10.  
26 Aninia Nadig, “Human Smuggling, National Security and Refugee Protection,” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 15(1) (2002): 3. 
27 Although claims of rising numbers of asylum seekers were used to justify restrictive policies, 
Christina Boswell questions whether this situation in fact qualified as an asylum ‘crisis. ‘ Christina 
Boswell, “European Values and the Asylum Crisis,” International Affairs 76 (2000): 541. Sandra 
Lavenex echoes this, pointing out that it was not until the war in the Balkans that Europe faced a 
serious influx of asylum seekers. Yet, by this time most parts of the second agreement of Schengen 
1990 had already been agreed, and therefore cannot be justified as a policy response. Sandra Lavenex, 
“The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional Legacies,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies 39 (2001), 857.  
28 Roger Zetter, “More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of 
Globalization,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (2007): 180. 
29 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitisation of Migration,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 38(5): 752. 
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refugees.’30 Migration came to be seen as a threat to the welfare state.31 The resulting 
swing in public perception played a significant role in driving policy direction; 
foreigners were portrayed as a threat to stability and security.32 This led to a paradigm 
shift, from rights-based refugee policies based on reception and inclusion, to 
securitised asylum policies geared at exclusion.   
Across Western Europe, domestic asylum policies became more hostile as 
countries began to discourage asylum seeking, and looked instead at containing 
refugees in their home state.33 Initially there was no attempt at formal policy co-
ordination, although all countries took up similar policies at more or less the same 
time to avoid incurring an increased asylum burden as a consequence of neighbouring 
states’ restrictive policies.34 The unifying feature of these policies was that they 
defined protection and persecution in a restrictive, legalistic framework.  Asylum 
seekers were faced with restricted access to social services as states attempted to 
reduce the ‘pull factor’ by reducing welfare entitlement.35  Policies of deterrence were 
directed at all migrants from the less-developed world, with no distinction between 
immigrants and forced migrants.36  It was against this restrictive background that 
Member States began to forge a common European approach to asylum.  These 
                                                
30 Christina Boswell, European Migration Influx: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, 54. 
31 Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” 756. 
32 Boswell, European Migration Influx: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion, 54. See also 
Sandra Lavenex,  The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between human rights and internal 
security (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001):857. Lavenex illustrates that this view was reinforced at the end of 
80s when the dramatic increase in asylum seekers was perceived as a threat both to the viability of the 
Member States and to the security of the Union.  
33 Virginie Giraudon, “Immigration and Asylum: A High Politics Agenda,” in Developments in the 
European Union 2, ed. Desmond Dinian and Margaret Green Cowles (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004):162. 
34 Emek M. Uçarer,  “Guarding the Borders of the European Union: Paths, Portals and Prerogatives,” in 
Migration and the Externalities of European Integration, eds. Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 20. 
35 Andrew Geddes, “The EU Migration Regime’s Effects on European Welfare States.” in Migration 
and the Externalities of European Integration, ed. Sandra Lavenex and Emek M. Uçarer (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2002), 203. 
36 James C. Hathaway, “Harmonizing for Whom? The Devaluation of Refugee Protection in an Era of 
European Economic Integration” Cornell International Law Journal 26: 723. 
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changes in the response to forced migrants saw the development of the security 
paradigm, which has yielded policies based on deterrence and exclusion at the 
European level.   
The beginning of a common European asylum policy 
The security paradigm, which pervades all aspects of the EU’s asylum policy, 
has been closely linked to the development of the single market.  The overarching aim 
of ‘securing’ the economic area of free movement inexorably focussed EU policy co-
operation on the deterrence and exclusion of asylum seekers.37  The catalyst for 
formal European cooperation in the area of asylum was the creation of an area of free 
movement, which began with the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) on 31 
December 1992.38 Dismantling the internal borders between the signatory states 
inevitably raised the issue of control at the external frontiers.  Individual states 
perceived a need to protect themselves against a possible influx of migrants and 
asylum seekers where a neighbouring state failed to control its borders.39 Ultimately, 
the spectre of open internal borders became a pretext for justifying security measures 
geared at prevention of access.40 The relaxing of internal control was counterbalanced 
by a strengthening of the external frontier of the Union.41  
                                                
37 Ingrid Boccardi, Europe and Refugees- Towards an Asylum Policy  (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), 48. 
38 Article 13 of the SEA describes the internal market as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty.’ Andrew Geddes, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 3. 
39 Noll, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of 
Deflection, 21.  
40 Didier Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?” in Controlling 
Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2005): 68. 
41 Gregor Noll and Jens Vested-Hansen, “Non-Communitarians: Refugee and Asylum Policies,” in The 
EU and Human Rights. Ed. Philip Alston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 362. 
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Following the signing of the SEA, common asylum policy was developed in the 
trans-governmental arena.  Negotiations drew upon a network of security experts who 
were very influential in policy-making.42 The inevitable focus on migration control 
fuelled the discursive construction of asylum seekers as a potential threat to the EU.43 
This approach naturally favoured a narrow interpretation of the Refugee Convention 
with the explicit aim of reducing refugee flows.44  
European asylum policy cooperation gained momentum due to the proximity of 
the 1991 Yugoslav crisis, which created an influx of asylum seekers into Europe.  
Policy initiatives favoured a restrictive approach.45 Thus, concepts such as safe third 
countries, safe countries of origin and manifestly unfounded claims were introduced 
into the acquis.  They were taken up by the Third Pillar of the TEU under the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1993 and eventually became incorporated into the provisions for the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice under the Treaty of Amsterdam.  In this way, 
these securitised measures came to form the foundations for the common asylum 
policies of the EU.46  
What is the Common European Asylum System? 
After nearly a decade of European cooperation on asylum policy, the EU voiced 
a commitment to the creation of a common asylum policy within a broader context of 
political and human rights and grounded in absolute respect for the right to seek 
asylum.  The goal of creating a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was 
                                                
42 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity; Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, 72. 
43 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue 
Shopping,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38 (2000): 259. 
44 Boccardi, Europe and Refugees- Towards an Asylum Policy, 25. 
45 Satvinder Singh Juss, “The Decline and Decay of European Refugee Policy,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 25(4) (2005): 759. 
46 Lavenex, The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human Rights and Internal Security, 
83. 
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tabled in 1999 at the Tampere European Council.  The common asylum policy was to 
be based on the full and inclusive application of the Refugee Convention.47 The 
common EU asylum regime was to be a constituent part of the newly created Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.  Harmonised policies would allow the EU to become a  
‘single asylum space,’ thus ensuring a consistent asylum process and equivalent levels 
of protection throughout the Union.48  
The CEAS comprises an integrated system for regulating asylum policy and 
practice to ensure similar reception conditions and levels of protection in all Member 
States.  It consists of a body of Directives, which are binding on Member States as to 
the result to be achieved, and Regulations, which are directly binding on Member 
States.  These instruments form an organised body of law, which comprises the EU’s 
asylum acquis.49  To date, the EU has adopted six major pieces of legislation in the 
field of asylum: the Temporary Protection Directive50; the Reception Directive51; the 
Dublin II Regulation;52 the Qualification Directive;53 the Procedures Directive54 and 
the Returns Directive.55   
                                                
47 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Tampere 15-16 October 1999, paragraph 14. 
48 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Tampere 15-16 October 1999, paragraph 13. 
49 Hemme Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, (Leiden and Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2006), 195. 
50 EU Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between 
Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ L 212/12 of 20 
July, 2001. 
51 EU Council Directive 2003/9/EC on laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum 
seekers, OJ L 31/18 of 27 January, 2003.   
52 Council Regulation 343/2003 on responsibility for asylum applications, OJ 2003 L 50/1 of 1 Sep. 
2003. 
53 EU Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L304/12 of 30 September 2004. 
54 EU Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005, L326/13 of 1 December 2005. 
55 EU Council Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures for illegally staying third 
country nationals, OJ L 348/98 of 16 December 2008. 
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Phase One of the CEAS was implemented between 1999-2004 under the 
Tampere programme.  This process involved the adoption of common instruments to 
set minimum standards to harmonise key components of Member States’ domestic 
asylum systems, with the aim of reducing secondary movements between Member 
States.56 The first phase instruments were unanimously agreed by the Council, while 
the European Parliament’s role was limited to consultation.  The unanimity 
requirement seriously impaired the decision-making process, and allowed Member 
States to engage in lowest common denominator bargaining, with an express focus on 
policies of deterrence.57  
The Hague Programme retained the ambition of the creation of a “common 
asylum procedure and uniform status based on full and inclusive application of the 
Refugee Convention and other relevant treaties.”58 Changes in decision-making meant 
that instruments were agreed under co-decision, with the European Parliament and the 
Council on equal terms.  However, the asylum policy initiatives developed under the 
Hague Programme were imbued with a heavy emphasis on security, at the expense of 
refugees’ human rights.59 
The ‘second phase’ of the CEAS was launched with the Commission’s 2007 
Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System,60 which attempted to 
inject transparency into the process though the establishment of a consultation process 
                                                
56 Madeleine Garlick, “The Common European Asylum System and the European Court of Justice: 
New Jurisdiction and New Challenges,” in The European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice Ten Years On, ed. Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carerra and Alejandro Eggenschwiler, Brussels: 
CEPS, 2010, 50. 
57  Frances Nicholson, “Challenges to Forging a Common European Asylum System in Line With 
International Obligations,” in EU Immigration and Asylum Law, ed Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 507. 
58The Hague Programme: Strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, 4-5 November 2004, OJ 2005 C 53/01 para 1.3. 
59 Didier Bigo, “Liberty, whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the Conception of Freedom,” in 
Security vs. Freedom: A Challenge For Europe’s Future, ed. Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carerra 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 35. 
60European Commission, “Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System,” (COM 
(2007) 301, final). 
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with stakeholders.  However, the 2008 Returns Directive represented a further blow to 
the human rights of protection seekers.  The policy plan “Asylum – an integrated 
approach to protection across the EU,” 61 released in 2008 as part of the new five-year 
programme for Justice, Freedom and Security includes a commitment to creating 
higher protection standards, and provides for the amendment of the Qualification 
Directive, the Procedures Directive and the Reception Directives as well as the Dublin 
Regulation. 
 The CEAS is now in its final phase of construction, under the Stockholm 
Programme: An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen.62  The 
Stockholm Programme sets the objective of a CEAS “based on high protection 
standards” and states that “individuals, regardless of the Member State in which their 
application for asylum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level of treatment as 
regards reception conditions, and the same level as regards procedural arrangements 
and status determination.”63 It is currently forecast that a fully integrated EU-wide 
system of asylum including a common asylum procedure and a uniform European 
Union refugee status is to be in place by 2012.64  
The creation of a supranational asylum regime has led to a dramatic erosion of 
refugees’ rights in the EU.65  In spite of proclaimed commitments to the human rights 
of protection seekers, the harmonisation of asylum policies has in fact lowered 
                                                
61 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Policy Plan on Asylum: An 
integrated approach to protection across the EU,” COM(2008) 360 final. 
62 The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizen, 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of the European Union, 9-10 December, 2009. OJ 
2010 C83/47. 
63 “The Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens,” para. 6.2. 
64 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “An area of 
freedom, security and justice serving the citizen,” COM (2009) 262/4, 27.  
65 Juss, “The Decline and Decay of European Refugee Policy,” 752. 
12 
protection standards in many Member States.66 Moreover, the creation of binding 
supranational asylum instruments has been coupled with a dramatic increase in 
admission controls at the external frontier of the Union, as well as stringent visa 
requirements and travel restrictions.  These barriers prevent asylum seekers from even 
gaining access to the EU’s asylum system in order to claim international protection.  
The EU’s failure to provide human guarantees for refugees is a significant challenge 
to its global role in the field of human rights. 
Methodology and literature review 
This thesis employs discourse analysis to examine the gulf which separates the 
official rhetoric emphasising the overarching importance of creating a common 
European asylum system based on the “full and inclusive application” of the Refugee 
Convention, and the securitised content of the acquis, which clearly fails to safeguard 
the fundamental rights of those seeking asylum in the European Union.  The research 
takes the form of policy analysis, and is grounded in a human rights framework of 
inquiry.  This human rights perspective is used to investigate the normative 
inconsistencies inherent to the EU’s securitised approach to asylum, and to put 
forward recommendations for an approach to asylum in the EU that engenders a 
rights-based approach to protection.  The analysis of contemporary EU asylum policy 
and practice demonstrates that, until the security frame embedded in the trans-
governmental structures of EU asylum policymaking is supplanted, the realisation of 
a rights-based asylum system in the EU will not be possible. 
The examination of the EU’s asylum policies centres on the key legislative 
instruments of the CEAS, and the Commission Communications and European 
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Council Conclusions which support them.  The Dublin II Regulation, the 
Qualification Directive, and the Procedures Directive are examined in greater detail.  
The study also examines proposals for an integrated approach to refugee protection as 
contained in the Commission’s 2008 Policy plan on asylum, and the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum.67  
This thesis draws extensively on official policy analysis and policy briefs which 
provide ongoing commentary on developments in the EU’s asylum policy.  The 
UNHCR68 and the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)69 closely 
monitor developments in the CEAS.  Other NGOs, such as Oxfam and Amnesty 
International, also play a key advocacy role for the human rights of refugees, and 
have released responses to EU law and policy.  These position papers have been a 
significant source of research material. 
The securitisation of asylum in the EU has eroded the distinction between 
refugee protection and migration control in asylum policymaking, and has legitimised 
the pursuit of highly restrictive asylum policies, although this fundamentally 
contradicts the international obligations of the EU and its Member States at 
international refugee and human rights law.  Jef Huysmans demonstrates that 
securitisation theory is crucial to understanding the restrictive trajectory, which has 
characterised EU asylum policymaking.70 He shows how this theoretical framework 
illuminates the governmental processes, which have allowed refugee protection to 
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become transposed into a security issue in the EU.71 Didier Bigo also examines the 
securitisation of asylum in the EU.  He explores the dynamics, which have allowed 
bureaucratic actors and security technologies to precipitate the securitisation of 
asylum in the EU.  Bigo shows that the inherent security focus of security agencies 
inevitably assimilates asylum with criminality, illegality and irregular migration.72 He 
contends that the securitarian frame, which pervades the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice has destabilised the boundaries of fundamental rights, to the 
extent that security controls, which undermine the human rights of protection seekers 
occur in the name of freedom.73  
Although securitised asylum policies have been a defining feature of EU asylum 
policy cooperation since its inception, the securitisation of asylum in the EU 
intensified as a consequence of the EU’s counter terrorism response.  Thierry Balzacq 
examines the ways in which the EU’s counter terrorism approach has allowed the 
development of securitised policy tools, which allow security to override fundamental 
human rights considerations.74 Elspeth Guild has also explored the impact of the EU’s 
anti terrorist measures on its responses to forced migration.  She demonstrates that the 
focus on enhancing external border control, which underpins the EU’s counter 
terrorism measures, has inevitably placed forced migration at the centre of the debate 
over national security.75 Guild also investigates the EU’s prioritisation of security 
concerns within its asylum policy has occurred at the expense of its international 
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human rights commitments, in ways that have considerably damaged its international 
role in the field of human rights.76  
The policy analysis released by the Centre for European Policy Studies has also 
expressly monitored the securitisation of the EU’s asylum policies.  For example, the 
CHALLENGE project,77 which operated during The Hague Programme, evaluated the 
relationship between freedom and security in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, and focussed on the fundamental human rights impacts of the policy 
initiatives of the AFSJ.  In a similar vein, the Centre for European Policy Studies is 
currently running the INEX project, which is following policy developments in the 
Stockholm programme, with an express focus on monitoring the ongoing 
developments in security technologies in terms of their human rights impact.78 
The security focus in the EU’s approach to asylum is codified in the 
supranational legislative content of the asylum acquis.  This substantially undermines 
the ‘duty to protect,’ as it is enshrined in international refugee and human rights law.  
The implications of this are followed by a number of legal commentators.  Guy S.  
Goodwin Gill has followed the restrictive developments of the EU’s supranational 
asylum regime.  His research emphasises the fundamental importance of a good faith 
commitment to fundamental human rights principles in achieving refugee protection.79 
He demonstrates the ways in which the EU’s supranational asylum provisions fail to 
respect the fundamental principles of human rights, which form the basis of refugee 
law.   In The Refugee in International Law Goodwin Gill and Jane Mc Adam provide 
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an exhaustive analysis of the legal inconsistencies contained in the EU’s supranational 
refugee regime.80  This highlights the extent to which the legislative content of the 
CEAS diverges from the protection norms of international refugee law.  The recent 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon has opened the possibility for a further stage of 
legislative cooperation, which would allow the development of supranational asylum 
instruments that fully adhere to international law.  However, whether these recent 
changes will enhance the conditions for protection seekers in the EU remains in 
question.  Marià-Teresa Gill-Baso argues that the fact that right to asylum has become 
legally binding in the EU will significantly improve human rights guarantees for 
refugees.81  Madeleine Garlick also argues that the changes ensuing from Treaty of 
Lisbon have the potential to enhance the EU’s single asylum space, yet she remains 
cautious about the extent that these developments will effect change.82 
The EU needs to replace its securitised vision of asylum with an approach to 
refugee protection which addresses refugees’ moral claim to international protection.  
Seyla Benhabib provides such a human rights framework in The Rights of Others.83  
She demonstrates that principles of fundamental human rights place an imperative on 
states to open their borders and guarantee admission to asylum seekers.  She uses this 
to unpack the normative inconsistencies inherent in approaching refugee protection 
from a state security perspective.  Benhabib stresses the fundamental importance of 
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admission of refugees to guarantee their rights.84 Her argument makes it clear that 
measures which thwart access to protection are morally untenable.85   
An inherent flaw in Benhabib’s argument for universal inclusion is that it 
diverges greatly both politically and practically from what is achievable.  In The 
Ethics and Politics of Asylum Matthew Gibney articulates an alternative solution.  He 
outlines a response to refugees, which he argues has both “ethical force” and 
“practical relevance.”86 He contends that, although those refugees present at the 
external border have particularly strong claim to admission, the moral obligation to 
refugees extends to the entire global refugee population.87 Thus, while Gibney accepts 
that states may be justified in refusing entry to refugees where the state’s protection 
capacity has been exceeded, strategies that seek to minimise protection obligations at 
international law, where protection spaces are available, such as those employed by 
the EU, are not morally defensible.88 He observes that a failure to guarantee refugees’ 
rights degrades the value of human rights more generally.89  As part of a commitment 
to the fundamental values of human rights it is imperative that the EU ensures that its 
asylum policies facilitate access to international protection.   
 The development of a rights-based asylum regime in the EU is also crucial to 
its external relations.  The EU’s restrictive asylum measures externalise responsibility 
for a growing number of refugees.  This practice has a profound impact on the asylum 
burden incurred by neighbouring countries, and colours the EU’s relations with 
countries in the European neighbourhood.  Christina Boswell has followed the 
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developments in this ‘external dimension’ of the EU’s asylum policies.90 Her research 
shows that the EU’s own restrictive practice influences neighbouring countries’ 
responses to refugees.  It is therefore imperative that the EU demonstrates a rights-
based approach to protection in its own practices towards refugees.   
The challenge of realising a single asylum space in the EU is compounded by 
the lack of consistency in Member State practice.  UNHCR research has found that 
the implementation of the supranational asylum provisions is highly variable.91 This 
lack of coherence leads to great discrepancies in reception conditions and asylum 
decision-making, which seriously impairs the functionality of the ‘single asylum 
space.’ These disparities also have significant human rights implications, as the EU 
asylum system is premised on the understanding that only one Member State is 
responsible for processing an asylum claim.  A further barrier to the realisation of a 
common asylum system in the EU is the absence of intra-EU burden-sharing 
mechanisms to spread humanitarian obligations evenly across Member States.  Eiko 
Thielemann argues that, ultimately, the viability of the EU’s single asylum space rests 
on the creation of an intra-EU burden-sharing mechanism to mitigate the imbalances, 
which impair its asylum space.92  
The completion of the EU’s common asylum system remains shrouded in 
uncertainty.  The new legal framework for creating asylum legislation, and the 
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increased competence of the European Court of Justice in adjudicating the EU’s 
asylum policies and Member States’ compliance with them are necessary 
preconditions for ensuring a rights-based asylum policy in the EU.  However, 
although the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon have established sound 
institutional foundations from which to develop comprehensive asylum legislation, 
the EU’s capacity to achieve such a regime ultimately requires the commitment of 
Member States.  Elizabeth Collett and Carl Levy argue that recent moves towards 
intergovernmental asylum cooperation may portend a decision to abandon the goal of 
realising a fully functioning asylum system in the EU.93 It is clear that a rights-based 
asylum policy in the EU’s asylum policy can only be achieved if asylum 
policymaking is de-securitised.  This would allow refugee protection be approached 
from a human rights perspective, and facilitate the development of policies grounded 
in human security.  However, such a change will only be possible if it is wholly 
supported by Member States.   
Chapter outlines 
This thesis explores the ways in which the EU’s restrictive approach to asylum 
manifestly departs from the protection imperative of international refugee and human 
rights law, as well as damaging the integrity of the human rights principles, which 
underpin the global protection regime.  The first chapter  “The Securitisation of 
Asylum in the EU,” examines the development of the securitised policy frame in EU 
asylum policy-making.  It demonstrates that the roots of the EU’s restrictive asylum 
policies can be traced to the first stages of European asylum cooperation.  This 
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chapter then evaluates the impact of the EU’s counter terrorism approach and shows 
that the EU’s focus on enhancing external border control in response to the spectre of 
international terrorism raised by the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 
2001 entrenched the security focus already present in EU asylum politics.  The EU’s 
anti terrorism initiatives, which saw the development of surveillance and control 
technologies, were aimed at enhancing control of the EU’s external borders.  This 
focus on internal security has led the human rights of protection seekers to be further 
subsumed by exceptional security demands.  The analysis of the securitisation of 
asylum in the EU illustrates that the realisations of a rights-based refugee policy in the 
EU will only be possible if a paradigm shift occurs, to allow refugee protection to be 
approached from a human security perspective.   
The second chapter “International Refugee Law and the EU’s Duty to Protect” 
examines the EU’s securitised approach to asylum, as it is manifest in the 
supranational legislation of the CEAS.  Although the EU presents its asylum 
instruments against a commitment to build a rights-based refugee policy based on the 
1951 Refugee Convention, the content of the acquis is fundamentally incompatible 
with the object and purpose of this covenant.  This chapter backgrounds the EU’s 
‘duty to protect’ at international refugee and human rights law, at both the European 
and the international levels.  It assesses the legislative content of the EU’s 
supranational asylum instruments against these normative requirements and 
illuminates the ways in which the EU’s asylum policy currently fails to adhere to the 
fundamental principles of human rights and refugee law.  The chapter then looks at 
the ways in which the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the human rights guarantees for 
asylum seekers in the EU. 
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The third chapter  “A Rights-based Approach to Protection in the EU Context” 
addresses the requirements for a morally defensible asylum policy in the 
contemporary global context, where two thirds of the world’s refugees are in 
situations of protracted exile.  It shows that the universal moral element contained in 
the ‘duty to protect’ refugees transcends the statist prerogative to control entry into its 
territory.  This argument is used to outline the minimum substantive requirements for 
a EU asylum policy, which truly engenders a rights-based approach to protection.  
The EU needs to ensure that its refugee and border policies are anchored in the human 
rights values it purports to defend, by facilitating spontaneous access to its asylum 
space.  It also needs to receive a much larger number of refugees though its 
resettlement programmes.  In addition to this, the EU may develop supplementary 
mechanisms, which provide refugees with protection in their regions of origin.  
However, extraterritorial protections initiatives must be developed in parallel with a 
fundamental reorientation of the securitised measures that currently prevent refugees 
from accessing the EU’s own protection space. 
The fourth chapter “Towards a ‘Single Asylum Space’?” turns to an evaluation 
of the EU’s protection area as it enters its final phase of construction.  The EU must 
overcome significant obstacles to realise a fully functioning common asylum system.  
The single asylum space is highly fragmented and there are great discrepancies in 
protection standards within the EU.  The variable geometry of the EU’s protection 
space insulates certain Member States from asylum flows, while placing a 
disproportionate burden on those States whose frontiers span the external border of 
the EU.  This chapter examines the prospects for the development of an intra-EU 
burden-sharing mechanism to mitigate this problem. 
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The final chapter of the thesis “The CEAS in the Post-Lisbon Environment: 
Challenges Ahead,” summarises the prospects for realising a rights-based asylum 
regime in the EU in the wake of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The ratification of this treaty 
provides the institutional and legal framework necessary to ensure a rights-based 
approach to protection.  However, although the finalisation stage of the CEAS 
presents a unique opportunity for the EU to realign its asylum acquis with the 
principles of refugee protection, it remains in question whether this avenue will be 
taken. 
Conclusion 
The creation of a regional protection area in the EU, through the binding 
supranational legislation of the CEAS, is of pivotal significance for the global refugee 
regime.  With 27 Member States the EU is a major player within the system of 
international refugee protection, and its restrictive actions have severely impacted on 
the global asylum space and substantially weakened the asylum norm.  At present, the 
EU’s role as an international human rights actor is jeapordised by the normative 
incongruities of its securitised asylum and border policies.  The EU’s exclusionary 
approach towards asylum seekers has damaged its reputation as a human rights 
protector.94 The EU’s use of control measures to limit its protection responsibilities at 
international human rights and refugee law is fundamentally inconsistent with its 
proclaimed commitment to human rights values.  Ultimately, the EU’s approach to 
refugee protection serves as a litmus test for its commitment to the ideological value 
of human rights.  The consummate failure to respect the human rights imperative of 
international protection compromises the EU’s authority in the human rights field and 
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undermines its credibility in the global arena.  The first step towards achieving a 
common asylum system grounded in fundamental human rights values would be for 
the EU to remove the securitising conditions which currently impede the development 
of a common European asylum policy.  The security paradigm, which informs EU 
asylum policymaking, is examined in the following chapter.  
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Chapter One: 
The Securitisation of Asylum in the EU 
Introduction 
The launch of the Common European Asylum System was accompanied by an 
express political commitment to  “absolute respect for the right to seek asylum,” 
embedded in a vision of “an open and secure European Union, fully committed to the 
obligations of the Geneva Convention and other relevant human rights instruments.” 95 
This signified the political will to re-align European asylum policy with the principles 
of international refugee law, following a decade of restrictive intergovernmental 
cooperation, which had seen a dramatic erosion of human rights values in asylum 
policies.   
However, thirteen years into the project, the EU’s asylum regime continues to 
be geared at reducing the scope of Member States’ protection obligations to refugees 
and asylum seekers by preventing the spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers on EU 
territory through extra-territorial controls, interception measures, and strict entry 
requirements.  As the EU has developed harmonised asylum instruments and policies, 
security has remained the ideational focus in this policy area.96 This has substantially 
weakened the legal status of asylum seekers in the EU.97 In fact, the harmonisation 
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process has seen a dramatic erosion of refugees’ rights.98  This has been exacerbated 
by exceptional security measures developed in the EU’s counter terrorism response, 
which have specifically targeted asylum seekers.   
The EU’s securitised asylum policies are the manifestation of the security 
paradigm, which informs this policy area.  This is a consequence of the asylum-
migration nexus in EU asylum policymaking, which leads refugee protection to be 
approached from a migration control perspective.  This distorts the human rights 
imperative of refugee protection and prevents the realisation of a rights-based 
protection regime in the EU.  The EU’s highly defensive asylum regime is not at all 
consistent with the liberal universalist vision of refugee protection enshrined in the 
Refugee Convention.   
The first part of this chapter applies the theory of securitisation to the 
development of asylum policies in the EU.  This theoretical framework illuminates 
the processes which have precipitated the transposition of asylum into a security issue 
in the EU, and accounts for the ways in which the security focus has continued to 
displace international human rights norms in of refugee protection.  This discussion is 
followed by an examination of EU asylum policy in its nascent stages, which 
demonstrates the ways in which the institutional configuration of trans-governmental 
decision-making has allowed control and security to dominate the policymaking 
agenda, perpetuating the securitisation of asylum.  The next section looks at EU 
asylum policymaking in the AFSJ.  It shows that, in spite of institutional changes in 
the EU, asylum policymaking has not been fully communitarised; instead the policy 
process has been characterised by a hybrid form of intergovernmental 
supranationalism, which has facilitated the development of securitised asylum 
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policies.99 This is examined against the backdrop of the EU’s counter terrorism 
approach, which inexorably intensified the focus on internal security in the AFSJ and 
justified the use of exceptional security measures, to the detriment of the EU’s 
protection obligations.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the conditions 
necessary for the de-securitisation of asylum policy.  The dynamics of securitisation 
are such that a rights-based refugee policy in the EU will only be possible if the 
existing securitarian frame is supplanted by a human rights approach to policymaking, 
placing the human security of protection seekers as its reference point. 
Theoretical focus: securitisation  
Securitisation theory uses a social-constructivist approach to examine the 
processes through which issues become perceived and handled as security 
measures.100 The rhetorical structure of securitisation presents a given issue as an 
existential threat that demands an exceptional emergency response beyond the normal 
parameters of the political process.101 As Jef Huysmans explains, “[s]ecuritization is 
characterized by a circular logic of defining and modulating hostile factors for the 
purpose of countering them politically and administratively.”102  The constitutive 
nature of the securitised policy frame means that, once exceptional measures have 
been legitimised, a return to normal politics can only occur through the de-
securitisation of an issue, a transformation which occurs through “the shifting of isses 
out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political 
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sphere.”103  The focus on the discursive construction of threats makes securitisation a 
highly applicable analytical tool for examining the normative dilemmas that 
inevitably arise when refugee protection is approached as a security issue.104 In the 
EU, the presentation of asylum seekers as a security threat has legitimised the pursuit 
of securitised asylum policies, to the detriment of its international  refugee protection 
obligations. 
 The analysis of securitisation as it is manifest in contemporary EU asylum 
policy draws on two distinct but complementary approaches.  The Copenhagen 
school, which first articulated the securitisation paradigm, centres the analysis on the 
political construction of insecurity and danger.  It focuses on the representation of a 
given issue as a security concern.  In this view, nothing constitutes a security issue a 
priori: securitisation is a process by which a threat is “written and talked into 
existence.”105  
In contrast, the Paris school, of which Didier Bigo is the main proponent, places 
its emphasis on the political-social construction of bureaucratic actors within the field 
of security.106 Bigo describes securitisation as a governmentality based on fear and 
suspicion of unsolicited migrants, among them asylum seekers.107  In focussing on the 
practice and agencies of securitisation, he illustrates the ways in which security 
professionals have shaped the development of administrative practices surrounding 
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EU asylum policy, leading to a convergence in internal and external ideas of security 
and perpetuating the political construction of asylum as a security risk.108 
Bigo has examined the ways in which intergovernmental security networks are 
implicated in steering EU asylum policy away from a rights-based approach to 
protection.  He illustrates the profound influence that the trans-national culture of 
security professionals exerts on EU governance mechanisms, and emphasises that the 
autonomy afforded to surveillance and control bureaucracies allows them to operate 
outside the scope of the judiciary.  This means that their policymaking is not subject 
to human rights considerations.109  Bigo shows that this phenomenon has become 
more pronounced post-September 11, as the spectre of international terrorism is used 
by security agencies to depict an ongoing state of emergency, which justifies the 
pursuit of exceptional policies.110 He explains the ways that this phenomenon has 
impaired the development of a rights-based asylum policy in the EU, and led the 
security of Member States to be prioritised over individual security.111  
  Jef Huysmans blends the political-social analysis of the Paris school with the 
social-constructivist approach of the Copenhagen school in his description of what he 
terms ‘the politics of insecurity,’ which have shaped the EU’s asylum system.112 
Huysmans emphasises the causal link between the creation of the internal market and 
the construction of an “internal security field” in the European Union.113 He 
demonstrates the ways that political framing of refugees and asylum seekers has 
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inevitably transformed asylum into an existential threat to the functional autonomy of 
the EU, and shows how political discourse has fuelled the ‘othering’ of refugees 
through the employment of powerful metaphors of ‘flood’ and ‘invasion.’114 
Huysmans shows the ways in fear and hostility towards asylum seekers in the EU is 
essentially a “politically constitutive act,” which has become institutionalised by 
technologies of government, to the extent that an exclusionary approach to third 
country nationals has become one of the ordering principles of the EU.115 Huysmans 
argues that the EU’s increased use of surveillance technology; profiling and data 
collection to monitor and regulate the movement of asylum seekers within EU 
territory is an inevitable consequence of securitisation.116  
Thierry Balzacq argues that security tools are the “empirical referents of 
policy,” and can therefore be used to illuminate the latent effects that underpin the 
dynamics of securitising practices, an approach, which is particularly applicable to the 
complexities of the EU context.117 Balzacq combines the discursive method employed 
by Huysmans and Bigo with a tool-based approach to show how the invocation of 
‘exceptional circumstances’ as part of the EU’s counter terrorism approach has  
transformed policy tools into securitising instruments.118 He argues that the inherent 
focus on security in the EU’s counter terrorist responses has allowed the development 
of policy tools which transcend normal data politics, and undermine fundamental 
human rights, particularly those of refugees and asylum seekers.119  
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Some commentators have questioned whether securitisation is present in EU 
asylum policymaking.120 For instance, Felix Ciutà cautions that the basic premise of 
securitisation theory, which focuses on actors’ identification of threats and 
formulation of exceptional measures to deal with them inevitably skews the analysis 
towards security; looking at measures as ‘exceptional’ obscures the possibility of their 
being simply part of ‘normal’ politics.121 He asserts that an investigation of migration 
policies elsewhere in the world shows that the policies in place in the EU are quite 
‘normal.’122 Christina Boswell also emphasises the limitations of securitisation theory 
as a heuristic device and outlines the limitations of using securitisation as a guide for 
empirical inquiry.123 She contends that, although the logic of securitisation may have 
narrow application in explaining the behaviour of agencies concerned with 
surveillance and intelligence, the over application of securitisation theories can 
obscure other trends in migration control.  Others have emphasised the limitations of 
using securitisation theory as an analytical tool in the EU, due to the complex 
policymaking process.124  However, the securitisation of the EU’s asylum policies is 
amply demonstrated in the EU’s departure from the normative requirements of 
international refugee law, in spite of its obligations under the Refugee Convention.   
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The emergence of the securitarian frame in EU asylum policy 
The  genesis of the security paradigm is found in intergovernmental security 
networks which predate formal European asylum policy cooperation.  TREVI (an 
acronym for Terrorisme Radicalisme Extremisme and Violence Internationale), was 
established in 1975 to allow Immigration and Justice Ministers to co-ordinate policies 
to combat the cross-border issues of terrorism.125 The dramatic increase in asylum 
seekers claiming protection in Western Europe at the end of the 1980s was perceived 
as a security threat.  The rapid change in patterns of spontaneous arrival in the post 
Cold-War context displaced the ideological significance, which had accompanied 
refugee protection in Western European States.  To deal with the growing numbers of 
asylum seekers, TREVI extended its scope, and, in 1980, immigration and asylum 
were added to its agenda.  This configuration inextricably linked terrorism and 
international violence with migration and asylum.126  
The organisational setup of the TREVI group served as a prototype for the 
intergovernmental negotiations from which the harmonised European asylum policy 
emerged.127 Police and customs cooperation evolved into the security continuum 
connecting border control, terrorism, international crime and migration, which now 
pervades all aspects of EU asylum policy.128 It was from this defensive standpoint that 
formal asylum policy coordination between European states began. 
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Early European asylum cooperation 
The signing of the Single European Act129 in 1985 created “an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons and capital is 
ensured.”130 The dismantling of internal borders within the EC territory was the 
catalyst for formal coordination of European asylum policies.  The Single European 
Act introduced an internal differentiation between EU citizens and third country 
nationals, as it ensured that the rights of EU citizens would transcend borders, at the 
same time excluding third country nationals.131  
The SEA limited free movement of persons to citizens of the European 
Community, meaning that common policy inevitably focussed on controlling the 
entry, movement and residence of third country nationals.132 This led to a 
strengthening of the external borders of the EC.133 In essence, enhanced external 
border controls became a pre-requisite for the internal freedom of the area of free 
movement.134 This control focus is manifest in the EU’s contemporary approach to 
border management, which employs techniques of deflection and interdiction and 
inevitably prevents refugees from accessing the EU asylum space. 
Subjecting refugee protection to the economic logic of the single market 
severely constrained the possibility of a human rights focus, and inevitably placed the 
emphasis on security.  As Andrew Geddes observes, the “processes of securitisation 
and the control of population are the foundation stones of liberalisation with the effect 
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that migration becomes a part of the security issue.”135 This economic approach 
allowed refugee policy to become identified as a constituent part of immigration 
controls.136  In this way the SEA created the ideological and institutional conditions 
necessary for securitisation; it ensured that formal European asylum policy 
cooperation would take place in the trans-governmental context, and it placed the 
emphasis of this policy process on the potential risks associated with the obligation to 
grant international protection, rather than on the protection of fundamental rights.137 
This meant that initial efforts at asylum policy harmonisation focussed on combating 
irregular migration and reducing forum shopping, with the principal aim of enhancing 
migration control.138  Once this initial framing became institutionalised in public 
policies, there was limited scope for reform.139 
Following the signing of the SEA, the Europeanisation of asylum policy was 
pursued in two intersecting transgovernmental fora: the Ad-Hoc Group Immigration, 
and the Schengen group, which produced the Dublin Convention140 and the Schengen 
Convention141 respectively.  These two groups retained TREVI’s organisational 
configuration, as well as its overarching aim of intensifying police and judicial 
cooperation to combat irregular migration.142 The decision-making structure, which 
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afforded migration and security officials a key role in policy development, provided 
the ideal context for the securitisation of asylum.   
Many commentators have described Member States’ decision to pursue trans-
governmental cooperation as a deliberate move to prevent Community institutions 
from encroaching on the senstive turf of territorial sovereignty.143 Virginie Guiraudon 
describes it as a clear case of venue shopping, and argues that migration control 
agencies and law and order officials favoured the vertical dimension of policy-
making, as it allowed them to sidestep the judicial constraints of the domestic level, 
and at the same time, avoid input from EU institutions.144 This situation was self-
perpetuating; the dominance of security experts led to the strengthening of “executive 
authority at the expense of legislative or judicial oversight,” which, in turn, made the 
agenda of security and control easier to advance.145  
This phenomenon characterised the policymaking process of both the Dublin 
and the Schengen groups, which sought to create legislation to secure and regulate the 
area of free movement.  This security-oriented approach ultimately laid the 
foundations for the common asylum policies of the EU.146  Migration and police 
officials, who presented securitisation as an unavoidable policy response, dominated 
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both sets of negotiations.147 Policymaking took place beyond the Community 
framework and supranational institutions had no competence in the decision-making 
process.148 This meant that the traditional advocates of a humanitarian approach to 
asylum, such as the UNHCR and the Council of Europe and the European Parliament 
were excluded entirely from negotiations and allowed asylum policy to depart from 
the protection ideals enshrined in the Refugee Convention.   
The Dublin and Schengen agreements yielded restrictive measures, such as 
carrier sanctions, safe countries and manifestly unfounded claims, which are 
fundamentally inconsistent with protection principles.  Both treaties placed the 
responsibility for determining an asylum application with the State  “which permitted 
the individual to arrive in the Union.”149 In this competitive climate, instead of 
focussing on the substantive assessment of asylum claims, Member States invested 
their resources in locating the ‘safe third country’ responsible for the protection 
seeker in question, and reducing the scope of their protection responsibilities.150 The 
provisions on determining the state responsible for processing an asylum claim 
undermined the international duty of each state to apply obligations under Refugee 
Convention independently.151 
The official beginnings of a common European asylum policy 
European asylum policy collaboration became institutionalised under the 1993 
Treaty of Maastricht, which made asylum an issue of “common interest” to the 
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Community.152 The treaty brought asylum policymaking into the Community arena, 
though a complex pillar structure, which ultimately imported the existing trans-
governmental decision-making structures into the Community context.153 This 
actually allowed Member States to increase their national executive authorities and 
control of their territorial sovereignty, as the Community setting allowed policy-
makers to circumvent political and judicial constraints at the domestic level.154  
Under Maastricht, policy frames linking migration and security continued to 
dominate the asylum policy agenda.155  Policymaking featured a strong security 
impulse and freedom of movement for EU citizens was counterbalanced with tighter 
controls on movement for third country nationals.156 The Maastricht era saw the 
adoption of many non-binding soft law provisions, such as the London Resolutions of 
1992, which contained highly contentious specifications surrounding the 
identification of manifestly unfounded claims and dealing with applications from 
third countries and the identification of safe third countries.  These securitised 
practices were subsequently incorporated into the provisions for the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), created by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into 
force May 1, 1999.157  
The Treaty of Amsterdam was a pivotal moment in the development of EU 
asylum policy.  It established an enhanced and accelerated harmonisation process for 
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the development of common asylum instruments towards the creation of its Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), which was to be a to be a constituent part of its 
newly created Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ).158  The institutional 
framework created by the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated Title IV (asylum and 
immigration) into the Community pillar, and shifted policymaking to legally binding 
modes of cooperation.  This move towards communitarianism introduced democratic 
accountability, judicial control, the rule of Community law, and introduced a clearly 
defined role for the Commission in the policymaking process.  The links between the 
JHA Council and other EU institutions promised significant change, and were 
expected to inject a human rights approach to asylum policy to break the security 
continuum of earlier cooperation.159 Commentators predicted that the increased role 
for the Commission in drafting legislative proposals for the common asylum 
instruments would result in a move away from the state-centrist development of 
asylum law and facilitate an institutional norm-creating system.160 The improved 
transparency and conditions for democratic debate, as well as increased consultation 
with UNHCR offered high hopes for improved refugee protection.161 The fact that the 
European Court of Justice had jurisdiction over Title IV was hailed as a significant 
advancement.162  
The legislative guidelines for the common European asylum policy were also 
promising.  Under Art 63(1) of the Amsterdam Treaty asylum measures were to be in 
accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  This was an 
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indication that the Union was also to be guided by the provisions of the Refugee 
Convention, as well as the Member States, who were already party to it.163 This 
connection between Community law on asylum and the international protection 
system was further strengthened in Declaration 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty, 
providing that “consultations shall be established with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant international organizations on matters 
relating to asylum policy.”164  
However, contrary to expectations, the EU’s increased role in the policy process 
was not accompanied policy change towards initiatives, which reflected the “full and 
inclusive application” of the Refugee Convention.  The normative and political 
configuration of liberty and security under Amsterdam effectively imported the 
security paradigm into the AFSJ.165 The unanimity requirement allowed Member 
States to continue to be the dominant actors in policymaking, and ensured that the 
initial harmonisation of asylum policy favoured a restrictive approach to refugee 
protection.166  
Although the Amsterdam Process had provided an opportunity to restructure 
faltering cooperation in the area of asylum and migration, the Treaty provisions 
lacked legal force, and were therefore unable to effect substantive change.167 This 
weakness meant that the EU institutions inevitably failed to legitimate the pursuit of 
their substantive preferences in policymaking, and the securitarian frame of trans-
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governmental cooperation endured.168 This meant that the harmonisation process 
pursued initiatives to control and limit asylum and immigration.169 The vision of a 
common European asylum policy remained embedded in a framework of exclusion 
and the goals of prevention of access, and deterrence continued to feature on the 
agenda.170  
The securitisation of asylum within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
The Treaty of Amsterdam ensured that the internal security field of the internal 
market became institutionalised within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.171 
As the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been progressively established, 
security has continued to dominate the agenda.172 The primary focus of the AFSJ has 
fallen on creating conditions of internal security, which has entrenched the perception 
that the external border is a prerequisite for the area of free movement.173 Ultimately, 
the security rationale has replaced the initial economic orientation of the area of free 
movement.174 The perceived need to secure the area of free movement has led to 
policy which specifically excludes asylum seekers through the harmonisation of visa 
policy, carrier liability and readmission agreements.175 This has had a profoundly 
negative effect on the EU as a destination of international protection.   
The ongoing focus on security is, in part, because of conceptual weaknesses: 
neither the EU nor the EC treaties contained an explicit definition of ‘freedom,’ 
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‘security’ or ‘justice.’176 The rhetoric of the AFSJ has repeatedly depicted the need for 
a “balance” between freedom and security, which falsely implies that a choice 
between the two is necessary.177  This focus on security has seriously impaired the 
development of a rights-based asylum policy in the EU.  Bigo argues that the adoption 
of measures designed to ensure free movement has modified the dialectic between 
freedom and security to the extent that the control-focus threatens to undermine the 
very concept of freedom in the AFSJ.178  
The securitisation paradigm is also highly visible in the EU’s external border 
controls, which are regulated within the Schengen framework.  The operational 
practices of FRONTEX,179 which was established to manage the EU’s intergrated 
border management strategy through surveillance and enforcement practices are blind 
to protection considerations and, as a consequence, its maritime operations regularly 
deflect vessels carrying Convention refugees.180 This encapsulates the inherent 
limitations of the security paradigm, as it effectively prevents the EU from creating a 
common asylum regime capable of offering genuine protection.181  
The enduring presence of the securitisation paradigm in EU asylum policy is 
attributable to persisting trans-governmental policymaking structures.  Although the 
EU institutions have been afforded an increased competence in policymaking, trans-
governmental structures have allowed interior ministers an ongoing role in asylum 
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policymaking.182 Security professionals have also remained heavily involved in 
determining policy direction.183 Their views on security tend to favour notions of 
threat and exception, at the expense of human rights.184  
The “latent duality” embedded in the decision-making processes of the AFSJ 
has meant that the trans-governmental securitarian frame has continued to pervade 
this policy area, leading security to be prioritised over the goals of freedom and 
justice, and impairing the development of asylum instruments grounded in the 
Refugee Convention.185 This is particularly evident in the Asylum Procedures 
Directive where the technical requirements of the negotiations led to political 
compromise, and saw the Commission’s original proposals diluted through lowest 
common denominator bargaining.186 The end result was a piece of legislation, which 
failed to comply with international protection standards.187 
The ongoing tension between the sovereign prerogative of Member States and 
the demands of communitarisation has also proved a significant barrier to policy 
convergence in the AFSJ.188 It has also led solidarity among sovereign states to be 
privileged over the rights of individual protection seekers.189 For example, the Treaty 
of Prüm, signed in 2005 by only seven Member States provides for the possibility of 
enhanced cooperation to increase cross-border cooperation in counter terrorism, 
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illegal migration and cross-border fight against crime, at the trans-governmental level, 
beyond the scope of EU framework.190 The Treaty of Prüm actually stands in 
opposition to the overarching objectives of the AFSJ, and, in so doing, weakens the 
EU.191  The EU Pact on Immigration and Asylum of February 2009192 allows 
exclusive competencies for Member States.  These fragmented initiatives sit oddly 
with the overarching goal of a common European asylum system.  The persistence of 
the transgovernmental method of coordination also threatens the functionality of the 
newly created European Asylum Support Office (EASO).193 The trans-governmental 
paradigm is diametrically opposed to the human rights paradigm.194 Therefore, as long 
as EU trans-governmental structures modulate EU asylum policymaking, the CEAS 
will follow a securitised trajectory. 
The focus on security in the AFSJ needs to be examined against the background 
of the EU’s response to international terrorism.  This heightened the territorial vision 
of security, and increased the perceived need to control the external border.195 The 
resultant tightening of external border controls and accompanying surveillance 
practices have had very negative consequences for the human rights of protection 
seekers in the EU.   
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The EU’s counter-terrorism policies: security tools, securitised borders and the 
securitisation of asylum 
The terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 made counter terrorism 
a major policy objective in the EU.196 In the securitised rhetoric of the EU’s counter 
terrorism response, border control was immediately isolated as an essential aspect of 
the EU’s counter terrorism strategies, inevitably placing forced migration at the centre 
of the debate over national security.197 Thus, a restrictive approach to forced 
migration became entrenched in the EU’s counter terrorism response and the ensuing 
asylum policy developments have further undermined the integrity of protection 
principles in the EU.   
The prioritisation of security concerns over human rights commitments was   
evidenced in the EU’s initial response to the terrorist attacks.  The JHA Council held 
an extraordinary meeting on 20 September 2001 to agree the ‘EU counter terrorism 
roadmap’, and declared the need “to examine urgently the relationship between the 
safeguarding of internal security and complying with international protection 
obligations and instruments.”198  The agenda of this meeting was devoted exclusively 
to the EU’s response to security and measure to combat terrorism, with the end result 
being to require the Commission to re-examine the relationship between safeguarding 
internal security and human rights obligations, including those towards refugees.199 
These conclusions were integrated into the Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism, 
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which was adopted on September 21 at the European Council.200 In December 2001 
the Commission released a “Working Document on the relationship between 
safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations 
and instruments,” which described a “balancing act,” that necessitated examining the 
“relationship between safeguarding of internal security and complying with 
international protection obligations and instruments” 201 This included a reassessment 
of the relationship between international protection obligations and instruments and 
the safeguarding of internal security.202 The Laeken Summit on the 14 and 15 
December 2001 reiterated the need to balance protection principles and migration 
control.203 
This ‘balancing’ approach attracted some high profile criticism for its negative 
impact on the human rights of refugees.  For example, in late September 2001 the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated: “The Assembly expresses 
its conviction that introducing additional restrictions on freedom of movement, 
including more hurdles for migration and for access to asylum, would be an 
absolutely inappropriate response to the rise of terrorism, and calls upon all member 
states to refrain from introducing such restrictive measures.”204 In November 2001 the 
UNHCR emphasised the need to balance terrorism concerns against human rights 
obligations.205 
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The majority of the tools and instruments employed in the EU’s fight against 
terrorism were not new.206 The EURODAC Regulation,207 which created a fingerprint 
database for storing the details of asylum seekers, was introduced in 2000, and the 
EU’s restrictive visa policy, was adopted in March of 2001.208  However, as Thierry 
Balzacq has illustrated, the EU’s policies on counter terrorism have transformed 
security tools into securitising instruments, to the detriment of the human rights of 
protection seekers.209 This approach has featured proliferation of security tools and 
changes in operational, administrative and institutional practices, which have 
specifically targeted asylum seekers.  210 For example, the EU’s Visa Information 
System (VIS)211 was created as part of the EU’s counter terrorism response, to 
complement the EURODAC Regulation.212 This approach accelerated the 
development of a series of surveillance, tracing and control measures, and saw the 
transformation of databases such as EURODAC and SIS from reporting tools into 
investigative and reporting systems, where the inherent emphasis on tracing and 
localising inevitably invites the policing these individuals, perpetuating the process of 
securitisation.213  
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The use of security tools in the fight against terrorism is in itself highly 
contestable; there is no indication that databases are a vital tool in countering 
terrorism.214 It remains in question whether mass surveillance in any way mitigates 
security risks.215 It is clear that biometric identifiers would not have prevented the 
terrorist attacks in London in 2007.216 The use of biometrics remains an unreliable 
means of identifying individuals.217 It is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
dangers of profiling and the inherent implications on human rights are not adequately 
considered in the EU.218 The deepening of links between law enforcement agencies 
and border controls by allowing them access to data and exchange of information has 
dramatically increased the vulnerability of asylum seekers trying to gain protection in 
the EU.219 
The EU’s increased use of technologies of control has transformed the nature of 
‘Fortress Europe.’  Advances in control technology make it increasingly difficult to 
determine where the EU’s border controls begin.220 The frontiers of the EU extend 
well beyond the external border, preventing individuals who fit a certain profile, such 
as asylum seekers, from departing their country of origin.221 As Bigo demonstrates, 
the security perimeter has been replaced by control at a distance.222 The EU’s system 
of ‘policing at a distance’ has fundamentally changed the nature of border security.  
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As Bigo observes, neither the narrative of ‘fortress Europe’ nor that of ‘Europe 
passoire” (sieve Europe) captures the extent to which Europe is now managed by 
technologies of control.223 The increase in pre-entry screening mechanisms have 
effectively relocated the external border away from the territorial boundary of the 
Union, to a target barrier isolating certain individuals.  Profiling is used to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate mobility.224 This practice allows the EU to prevent 
asylum seekers from making the journey to the EU.  These barriers have been 
described as “invisible policy walls.”225 This phenomenon, of ‘policing at a distance’ 
is much less visible than traditional border controls, and therefore this violation of 
civil liberties is more likely to occur beyond scrutiny.226 
The spectre of the international terrorist threat has fundamentally altered the 
concept of border security and increased the perceived link between border control 
and internal security.227 The EU’s response to international terrorism has led to border 
policies over determined by securitarian reasoning.228  The focus on the external 
border has led the obligation to admit those seeking international protection to be 
identified as a threat to internal security amid fears that refugee status could be open 
to abuse.229 The argument that the EU’s asylum system will easily allow terrorists to 
access the EU is erroneous, as applying for asylum is a highly regulated process, and 
therefore an unlikely avenue for a potential terrorist to choose.230 
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The impact that the EU’s counter terrorism strategies have had on the 
securitisation of asylum policies in the EU continues to be widely debated.  It has 
been argued that the events of 11 September 2001 were used as justification for 
security measures, which were already under consideration.231  Carl Levy argues that 
the overarching goal of a CEAS based on the Refugee Convention was all but 
subsumed by the counter terrorism agenda.232 Bigo contends that the EU’s response to 
the attacks of 11 September 2001 saw the goals of freedom and justice wholly 
subordinated to the attainment of security in the AFSJ.233 In contrast, Christina 
Boswell contends “neither political discourse nor policy practice apparently 
securitised post 9/11 or London or Madrid.”234 It has also been argued that the 
Commission prevented the impetus towards securitisation of asylum in the EU and 
ensured that the EU’s approach to asylum within its counter terrorism response has 
remained within the ambit of the Refugee Convention.235  
The exclusion of asylum seekers was the modus operandi of EU asylum policy 
well prior to 11 September 2001.  However there is abundant evidence that EU’s 
response to international terrorism has further entrenched the security paradigm in EU 
asylum policymaking.236  This has had a significant impact on the development of the 
legislative instruments of the CEAS.237 For instance, the Qualification Directive, 
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adopted in 2004 explicitly links security to terrorism and addresses these concerns in 
the procedures for determining refugee status and granting asylum.238 Its provisions 
vastly expand the grounds for exclusion of asylum seekers far beyond what is 
provided for in the Refugee Convention, listing being a danger to national security as 
grounds for rejection of an asylum claim.239  
The EU’s counter terrorism approach has intensified the security focus of the 
AFSJ.  This was particularly apparent during the Hague Programme, where “respect 
for fundamental freedoms and rights” was juxtaposed with a variety of overarching 
security goals.240  The Stockholm Programme maintains a commitment to 
fundamental rights, which continues to be couched within a strong security focus, as it 
aims to achieve “wider freedom in a safer environment.”241 
The EU counter terrorism documents continue to discursively link migration 
control measures to counter terrorism responses.242 This has intensified the 
securitisation of asylum, and normalised the construction of the migrant ‘other’ as a 
security threat.243 For instance, the EU’s counter terrorism strategies, such as tracing 
and increased search powers have fuelled an increased suspicion surrounding asylum 
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seekers and “confirm the public notion that…each migrant or asylum seeker is a 
possible terrorist.”244  
The spectre of international terrorism has led to the deepening of the security 
nexus between irregular entry and border security in EU law and policy.245 For 
instance, the EU’s focus on border control is identified as a key aspect of the need to 
“protect our societies against terrorism.”246 The EU’s counter terrorism policies depict 
an ongoing state of emergency, which is used as justification for the suspension of 
freedoms.247 The presence of terrorist concerns has legitimised normative responses 
designed to promote security, which extend well beyond traditional policy 
constraints.248 This has implications for the EU’s authority in the field of human 
rights.  It has been argued that undermining the EU’s AFSJ by allowing exceptional 
measures may ultimately represent a greater threat to the EU than international 
terrorism.249  
The securitisation paradigm also impairs the development of the external 
dimension of the EU’s asylum policy.  As Sandra Lavenex has argued, the EU’s 
externalisation of its responsibilty for refugees is a further manifestation of the 
securitarian frame, which underpins EU asylum policymaking: “the shift towards 
extraterritorial control is less a new phenomenon than the continuation of the trans-
governmental logic of cooperation.  In substantive terms, it reflects justice and home 
                                                
244 Brouwer,  “Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09,” 424. 
245 Guild and Carrera, “The European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On,” 
3. 
246 European Council ‘Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’. Brussels, 
19 November 2008, 15912/08, 4. 
247 Bigo, “Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?,” 90. 
248 Guild and Carrera, “The European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Ten Years On,” 
1. 
249 Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera, “The EU’s Fight Against International Terrorism: Security 
Problems, Insecure Solutions,” (Policy Brief No. 80, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
July 2005), accessed 15 September, 2010, www.libertysecurity.org/article340.html, 5. 
51 
affairs officials’ emphasis on control, and, therewith, the security aspect of 
migration.”250  
The effects of the EU’s use of measures to enhance internal security as part of 
its counter terrorism approach have highlighted the critical importance of balancing 
security policies against human rights considerations.  The debate about terrorism and 
security inevitably distorts the essence of human rights language.251 However, 
securitisation is not an inevitable policy response to the terrorist threat; the EU can 
achieve internal security without compromising its international obligations to 
refugees and asylum seekers.  The foundations for this can be found in international 
refugee and human rights law.252 
Conclusion 
The security paradigm in the EU’s asylum policymaking obscures the specific 
protection claims of refugees and thereby prevents the development of a functioning 
CEAS.  Human security and state security are not in fact diametrically opposed.253  
Realising a refugee policy, which is grounded in principles of protection demands that 
policymakers engage with the human security element of refugee protection.  This can 
be achieved through a reframing of the relation between migration and security, 
which places the emphasis on human security.254 The human security approach brings 
the moral dimension of refugee protection into sharper focus and inevitably leads to 
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policies focussed on protection.255 This would open up protection space in the EU and 
ensure the development of a common EU asylum policy, which balances security 
concerns against “absolute respect for the right to seek asylum.”256  
From the outset the trans-governmental mode of policymaking has prevented 
the development of rights-based asylum policies in the EU. The ongoing role of 
interior ministers in asylum policy cooperation presents a significant barrier to de-
securitisation.257 Therefore, the realisation of an asylum policy grounded in 
fundamental rights requires that asylum policymaking take place entirely in the 
Community arena.  This is a necessary first step towards the creation of a EU asylum 
policy, which truly engenders a rights-based approach to protection.   
 The codification of the EU’s securitised approach to asylum in the asylum 
acquis leaves the EU at odds with its obligations at international refugee and human 
rights law.  The following chapter will examine the human rights contradictions 
enshrined in the EU’s asylum acquis.  It will also address the incompatibility of the 
non-entrée mechanisms, which surround the EU’s asylum space with the protection 
imperative of international refugee law. 
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Chapter Two: 
International Refugee Law and The EU’s Duty to Protect  
Introduction 
EU Member States are bound by the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol.258   
This commitment is explicitly acknowledged in the preambles of the instruments, 
which comprise the binding supranational asylum legislation of its Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS).  However, the legislative content EU’s asylum 
acquis manifestly fails to adhere to the human rights imperative of refugee protection 
and, in some instances, seeks to minimise the EU’s obligations under this convention.  
Moreover, the EU’s border policies and visa regime effectively seal off the EU’s 
protection space from thousands of prospective asylum seekers.  This practice is 
fundamentally at odds with the protection imperative of the international law. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the basic parameters of international 
and European refugee law, in terms of the legal duties that this imposes on the EU and 
its Member States.  This is followed by a more detailed examination of those 
provisions in the Procedures Directive, and the Qualification Directive, which 
represent a significant departure from the provisions of the Refugee Convention.259  
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The chapter then examines the EU’s non-admission and non-arrival policies, which 
prevent asylum seekers from claiming international protection in the EU, against the 
normative requirements of international refugee law.  The final section will canvas the 
emerging possibilities for improving the protection provisions of the acquis, which 
are presented by the Treaty of Lisbon.   
Refugee protection and international refugee law in the EU 
The legal duty of EU Member States to offer protection to refugees can be 
found in a combination of refugee, human rights and humanitarian law.  The Refugee 
Convention is the centrepiece of this regime; however Member States remain liable 
under international human rights law, if they fail to safeguard against refoulement.260 
This principle is supported by general rules of international law, most significantly the 
principle of good faith.261  
As signatories of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
Member States are bound by pacta sunt servanda to remain true to all international 
agreements to which they are party.262  The “General Rule of Interpretation” contained 
in Article 31(1) of the VCLT states that treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in light of its object and purpose.”263 This means that Member States’ 
commitments to international law have primacy over any legislation produced at the 
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EU-level.  Furthermore, the EU is obliged not to impede Member States’ obligations 
under international law.264 EU legislation is thus secondary to international 
obligations.  The EU and its Member States remain legally bound to comply with the 
Refugee Convention, as well as the other international human rights treaties to which 
they are party, ahead of any instruments, which are to apply at the EU level.  In 
addition, the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol are a source of general 
principles of EU law, as they have been ratified by all Member States.265 
The refugee definition found in the Refugee Convention provides the standard 
for determining refugee status at international law.  Formal recognition of refugee 
status is declaratory, rather than constitutive; Convention refugees become so as they 
fulfil the definition  provided for in Article 1(A):   
persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social 
group, or political opinion, are outside their country of nationality 
or last habitual residence for stateless persons, and are unable 
because of such fear to return to that country.   
 States are prohibited from limiting the personal scope of this Article under 
Article 42 of the Refugee Convention.  Article 31 allows that refugees may enter 
states in an irregular manner, where that they can provide justifiable grounds for 
entering without the requisite documentation.266 International law indicates that those 
with a prima facie claim to refugee status are entitled to protection, regardless of 
whether they have been recognised as refugees.267 It has been argued that, when 
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Convention reasons are applied, this represents a de facto duty to admit refugees that 
fulfil the Convention definition.268 
International law contains no absolute right to be granted asylum.  However, 
there are specific conditions surrounding the granting of refugee status, which serve to 
provide human rights guarantees for the protection seeker: under international law, 
states are responsible for examining asylum claims made in their jurisdiction.269 A 
failure to recognise genuine refugees as such constitutes a violation of international 
law.270 Moreover, asylum seekers have a right to full protection until their refugee 
status has been determined.271 
The principle of non refoulement 
The non refoulement  principle forms the fundamental protection safeguard at 
international refugee law.272 EU Member States are bound to respect the principle of 
non refoulement , which encompasses  non refoulement to persecution, based on 
article 33 of the 1951 Convention,  and also non refoulement  to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  Crucially, the provisions surrounding 
non refoulement do not amount to a legal right to admission.273 However, as 
Goodwin-Gill argues,  “it would scarcely be consonant with considerations of good 
faith for a State to seek to avoid the principle of non refoulement by declining to make 
a determination of status.”274 This view has also been articulated by the UNHCR 
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Executive Committee, which describes non refoulement to entail “access to fair and 
efficient procedures for determining status and protection needs.”275 This has 
profound implications for the EU’s use of non-arrival policies, such as visa 
requirements and carrier sanctions, as well as for its practice of interdiction.276 
 As non refoulement extends to territory over which the state has jurisdiction, 
the obligation inevitably extends to all points of entry, such as border posts and transit 
zones.277 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention dictates that once refugees have 
entered a State’s territory, they must not be returned to persecution.  The legal basis 
for the non refoulement principle extends beyond the Refugee Convention to 
international human rights and humanitarian law.  It is supported by international 
obligations contained in the body of international humanitarian and human rights law, 
which provides significant safeguards against expulsion or extradition.278  
 Article 3 of the UN’s Convention against Torture (CAT)279 precludes the return 
of a person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that they 
would be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
In contrast to the Refugee Convention, which allows for certain exceptions, relating to 
‘national security’ and ‘public order,’ Article 3 of the CAT provides absolute 
protection from refoulement.280 In support of this, Articles 7 and 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights281 demand that States uphold the 
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rights contained in this Covenant to anyone in their jurisdiction and territory, which 
includes refugees.282 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)283 is also a significant source of safeguards against refoulement.284 Article 3 
of the ECHR provides that “No one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” This means that any return of an individual from 
within Europe to a country where they would face a substantial risk of suffering 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment would breach the State’s 
international human rights law obligations.285 The European Court of Human Rights is 
entitled to interpret the protection obligations of Council of Europe Member States 
under the European Convention on Human Rights.  The Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the absolute nature of Article 3, even in light of recent terrorist threats.286 
The ECHR has thus been a very effective instrument for protecting refugees from 
refoulement.287  
The non refoulement jurisprudence, of the European Court of Human Rights has 
strong implications for the policies of the CEAS, and on several occasions has ruled 
against EU practice.288 For example, in Soering289 the ECHR held that extradition was 
prohibited, where an individual faced a real risk of being subject to torture or inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving state, as “the object and 
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purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human 
beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its 
safeguards practical and effective.290  Chahal v United Kingdom ruled against 
expulsion on similar grounds.291 
More recently, the European Court of Human Rights has again stressed the 
unconditional nature non refoulement, and has established the principle that a State 
wishing to deport an individual on the grounds of having committed a serious 
criminal offence or constituting a threat to national security must first make an 
independent evaluation of the circumstances the individual would face in the country 
of return.  The inadmissibility decision in T.I.vUK292 demonstrates that removing an 
individual to an intermediary country, which is also a Contracting State, does not alter 
a state’s obligation to ensure that an applicant is not expelled and then exposed to a 
treatment contrary to Art 3 ECHR.293   Instead, the removing State incurs a further 
duty to ensure that the receiving State does not compromise the right of protection.294 
Thus, the protection of the individual is reinforced.295 The EU’s use of safe third 
country mechanisms is not consistent with this obligation to ensure that its actions do 
not expose an individual to refoulement.   
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Safe third countries 
The EU does not accept responsibility for asylum claims from protection 
seekers arriving on its territory from a ‘safe country of origin’ or a ‘safe third 
country.’ These procedural mechanisms underpin the EU’s extensive network of 
readmission agreements with third countries.296 The effects of this practice are 
difficult to assess, as there is no monitoring arrangement by the EU or its Member 
States for persons readmitted to third countries.297  However, under international 
refugee law, it is acceptable to transfer an asylum seeker to a third state where that 
state has a meaningful link to the asylum seeker, and where the state is capable and 
willing to determine the needs for protection and will provide it.298  The EU’s use of 
safe third countries is rather more loosely construed.  As Elspeth Guild observes: 
“[t]he link of the external dimension, which was based on making countries outside 
the Union responsible for human rights protection of asylum seekers,  [is now] 
shuffling them off completely to countries through which they have never passed and 
which owe them no other duty than that which comes into existence by reason of the 
Member States’ actions.”299   The EU’s use of the safe third country concept to divert 
its obligations under the Refugee Convention is contrary to the good faith principle 
which underpins the multilateral treaty regime and also incompatible with the 
convention’s object and purpose.300 
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The concept of ‘safe country of origin’ has no legal basis in the Refugee 
Convention.301 The notion of a safe country is inherently problematic, as it obscures 
the possibility of the threat pertaining to a particular individual only, even where the 
country is generally safe.  Goodwin Gill argues that this potential protection gap 
undermines the integrity of the non refoulement principle.302  Ultimately, the ‘safe 
country of origin’ concept is fundamentally inconsistent with the guiding assumptions 
of international refugee law, which require that individual asylum claims be 
determined on the basis of personhood, not nationality.303  
The EU’s designation of ‘safe third country’ is also contentious.  The EU 
returns asylum seekers to safe countries under the argument that they could have 
claimed asylum in their territory.  The return of asylum seekers to safe third countries 
from the EU is predicated on the assumption that the asylum seeker in question had 
access to ‘effective protection’ in this country.304 However, the concept of ‘effective 
protection’ in international law remains weak, and in the absence of a comprehensive 
definition the safe country mechanism is vulnerable to protection failures.305  
The EU’s ‘safe third country’ mechanisms  expose refugees to refoulement, 
where they are applied without sufficient protection safeguards.  For instance, the 
EU’s practice of return of asylum seekers to Libya, which is not a signatory of the 
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Refugee Convention, risks violating the non refoulement principle.306 There is much  
evidence that the EU’s application of ‘safe third country’ rules expose refugees to 
chain deportations, as they are transferred from safe third country to safe third 
country.307   The EU’s measures also fail to allow for the varying reception capacities 
of individual states.  In instances of return to developing countries the host state may 
be unable to provide the material conditions to provide refugees with meaningful 
human rights guarantees.308 As Erika Feller articulates: “[a] State is clearly in 
violation of its Convention obligations if, by its own actions, a situation is created 
whereby international protection that is needed is not available.”309  In spite of their 
obvious incompatibility with the protection assumptions of international refugee law, 
these safe third country provisions have been codified in the EU’s binding 
supranational legislation.   
The Asylum Procedures Directive 
The Asylum Procedures Directive endows safe country practices with binding 
force.  In so doing it fatally undermines the EU’s promise to guarantee fundamental 
rights in its harmonised asylum legislation.310  The Directive codifies exceptional 
provisions, such as ‘safe third country’, ‘safe country of origin’, ‘safe European third 
country’ and ‘country of first asylum.’  These provisions are applied with no 
consideration of the underlying protection claim, and the Directive provides no scope 
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for suspensive effect.311 The Directive lacks the requisite safeguards to ensure that 
asylum seeker will not be subjected to refoulement.312  
Under the Directive, applications from ‘safe countries of origin’ are generally 
treated as ‘manifestly unfounded.’313 Article 26 of the Procedures Directive defines 
‘first country of asylum’ as one in which an applicant was recognised as a refugee 
and, if readmitted, is still able to access that protection, or otherwise enjoy ‘sufficient 
protection’ including the benefit of the principle of non refoulement.314  
Under Article 36(1) Member States have the discretion to refuse to examine an 
application where the individual arrives from such a  ‘safe third country.’ The ‘safe 
third country’ notion assumes the inherent safety of any State that has ratified and 
observes the 1951 Refugee Convention and ECHR, has an asylum procedure 
prescribed by law and has been designated a safe third country by the Council.315 This 
could lead to cases of ‘refugees in orbit’ or chain refoulement.316  
The Qualification Directive 
The Qualification Directive claims to be “based on the full and inclusive 
application of the Geneva Convention” (Recital 2).317 Yet, it limits its scope to third 
country nationals or stateless persons and does not cover claims for asylum brought 
by a national of a Member States.  This is a direct contradiction of Article 3 of the 
Refugee Convention, which reads: 
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The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of the Convention 
to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of 
origin. 
All Member States are signatories of the Refugee Convention and are thus bound by 
its provisions.  Article 42 of the Refugee Convention permits no reservation to the 
refugee definition contained in article 1, unless revisions are requested under Article 
45; this avenue has not been taken.318  
The Directive also fails to cover the breadth of civil, political, social and 
economic rights contained in the Refugee Convention.319  The exclusion clauses listed 
under Article 17 of the Directive are much wider in scope than those provided for in 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, as they rule out granting international 
protection to any individual who has ever committed a serious crime, as well as 
“those who constitute a danger to the security of the Member State in which he or she 
is present”(Article 17 1)d)) This is also contrary to the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, which has shown protection from refoulement to be absolute.320 
A further inconsistency with the Refugee Convention can be found in the 
Directive’s definition of ‘subsidiary protection,’ which allows for a legal status 
surrounding international protection needs beyond the scope of the Convention 
definition.321 At first glance, this juxtaposition of ‘subsidiary’ protection, alongside 
‘conventional’ protection seems to represent a widening of the scope of protection 
provisions, and some commentators see the development of rights and benefits for 
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recipients of subsidiary protection as a major advance in protection standards.322An 
individual who qualifies for subsidiary protection is defined as a “third country 
national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of 
whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, 
if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or 
her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious 
harm.” These provisions formalise a legal status for individuals who benefit from 
protection under Member States’ non-refoulement obligations under international and 
regional law, but do not qualify for Convention status.323  
However, this additional status has, in fact, created significant protection gaps.  
Roger Zetter argues that the creation of the two-tier system of protection in the 
Qualification Directive has fractioned the refugee label.324 The broader scope offered 
by “subsidiary” protection category is tempered by the increased suspicion 
surrounding the assessment of applications.325 ECRE and UNCHR have voiced the 
need for equivalent levels of rights across all protection statuses, and are particularly 
critical that individuals need to demonstrate that “indiscriminate violence” is directed 
at them individually, in order to qualify for subsidiary protection.326   
In effect, subsidiary protection provisions have created a protection hierarchy, 
as ‘subsidiary protection’ status is subordinate to Convention status, and does not 
encompass the same level of integration rights.327 UNHCR has pointed out that 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries are seriously disadvantaged by their lesser status, 
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where they remain in the EU for long periods.328 The Qualification Directive has thus 
created a situation where asylum seekers in the EU are placed in legal limbo; they are 
protected by non refoulement provisions at international law, and simultaneously 
excluded from national versions of ‘subsidiary protection.’329 Ultimately the asylum 
provisions contained in the directive, particularly those surrounding ‘subsidiary 
protection’ threaten to make the institution of protection more precarious.330 Because 
of the EU’s global significance as a protection space, and the highly transferable 
nature of its policies, the Qualification Directive and the Procedures Directive will 
have a significant and lasting negative impact on the international refugee regime.331  
Access to protection  
The range of non entrée measures which surround the EU’s protection space 
make it very difficult for asylum seekers to even access the EU’s asylum system at 
all.  Asylum seekers are prevented from reaching the EU through the combined 
actions of hard border controls, interception practices, readmission agreements, 
stringent visa requirements, and carrier sanctions.  The use of these deterrence and 
deflective strategies to thwart the spontaneous arrival of protection seekers on EU 
territory is wholly inconsistent with the protection principles enshrined in the Refugee 
Convention.   
The legal architecture of the Refugee Convention represents a very cautious 
attempt to balance the competing demands of individual security and the sovereign 
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prerogative to exercise control over state territory, and as a consequence leaves 
certain elements of protection within the ambit of State discretion.332 The most 
significant lacuna is the absence of first admittance rights for refugees and asylum 
seekers.333 The EU has exploited this gap in its development of extraterritorial 
controls, which effectively block asylum seekers from accessing its asylum space, 
where they would be able to invoke the right to non refoulement.334  
This use of geography to circumvent the legal framework of refugee protection 
has been termed neo-refoulement.335  Elspeth Guild argues that these strategies of 
prevention of amount to the ‘de-territorialisation’ of sovereignty, which she describes 
as an “opportunistic exclusion of protection responsibilities which are tied to 
sovereignty,” which enables EU Member States to enjoy their sovereign rights 
without incurring the corresponding sovereign duties.336 
The legality of these non-arrival practices is widely questioned.  James 
Hathaway argues that States have a duty not to prevent an individual from seeking 
asylum in their territory.337 Geoff Gilbert takes this argument one step further in his 
argument that the declaratory nature of refugee status under the Refugee Convention 
makes prevention of access tantamount to refoulement.338 Goodwin Gill contends that 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, when read in conjunction with Article 33 on 
non refoulement,  provides support for a limited right of, at a minimum, temporary 
admission of asylum seekers to access fair and efficient refugee status procedures.339 
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However, he points out that in the absence of a right to asylum at international law, 
States enjoy a great deal of discretion to pursue such measures, and while interception 
and non-arrival policies may be demonstrably inconsistent with a commitment to 
human rights standards, they remain legally permissible.340  
 The EU has developed the most comprehensive regime of carrier sanctions 
and visa requirements in the world.341 The EU’s visa ‘black’ list effectively prevents 
individuals coming from these countries from legally accessing the EU asylum 
system.  The main refugee producing countries in 2009 (Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, 
Sudan and Somalia) are all on the EU visa black list.342  Visa nationals are prevented 
from travel as sea and air carriers are obliged to check the validity of travel 
documents, and refuse passage for individuals who do not have the requisite 
documentation or else face penalties.343 This is a significant barrier to the EU’s 
protection space. 
 The EU’s extraterritorial controls under the auspices of FRONTEX regularly 
prevent refugees from accessing the EU’s protection space.344 The technical approach 
taken by FRONTEX is not compatible with the EU’s protection resonsibilities.345 
Preventing refugees from accessing the EU asylum system, where they arrive 
irregularly at the external border is demonstrably at odds with protection principles, as 
the international protection regime provides that neither the mode of flight or the 
means of entry into the country of refuge should be a consideration which decides 
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who is more deserving of international protection.346  As the UNHCR notes, 
‘Interception measures that effectively deny refugees access to international 
protection, or which result in them being returned to the countries where their security 
is at risk, do not conform to prevailing international guidelines.’347  
Moreover, European primary and secondary law obliges border-control bodies 
to uphold the principle of non-refoulement and border control officials are bound by 
international law, even where acting extra-territorially, and must ensure that 
individuals who are intercepted are presented with the opportunity to stake their claim 
to asylum on EU territory.348 The subcontracting of border management in 
FRONTEX349 operations does not dilute the EU’s obligations at international law; 
Member States retain full responsibility to ensure that border control practices are 
consistent with international requirements.350  The use of interception measures 
against asylum seekers in fact violates the protection provisions contained in the 
acquis of the CEAS, as the Asylum Procedures Directive provides that Member States 
need to guarantee access to asylum.351 The Council Decision of April 2010 reaffirms 
the non refoulement obligations which apply during interceptions at sea.352 However, 
the EU needs to integrate protection safeguards into FRONTEX operations to ensure 
that non refoulement  is respected. 
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The use of control strategies to thwart the spontaneous arrival of protection 
seekers on EU territory is wholly inconsistent with the liberal Universalist approach 
to protection enshrined in the Refugee Convention.  International refugee law forms 
the safety net for refugees, but it can only provide legal guarantees insofar as 
protection seekers are able to access it.  As Kofi Annan noted in an address to the 
European Parliament: “When refugees cannot seek asylum because of offshore 
barriers…or are refused entry because of restrictive interpretations of the Convention, 
the asylum system is broken, and the promise of the Convention is broken too.”353 
Ultimately, the notion of a EU asylum system is worthless, if refugees are unable to 
access it.  Thus, to demonstrate a “full and inclusive application” of the Refugee 
Convention, the EU needs to assure refugees “the widest possible exercise 
of…fundamental rights and freedoms.”354 As part of this, it needs to ensure that any 
mechanisms to stem irregular migration are protection sensitive and do not prevent 
the arrival of asylum seekers onto its territory.   
The Treaty of Lisbon 
The potential for the asylum acquis to be reconciled with the protection norms 
of the Refugee Convention has been significantly enhanced by the recent ratification 
of the Treaty of Lisbon,355 which has elevated the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union356 to EU primary law.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights voices 
a clear commitment to fundamental principles essential to the fair treatment of 
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refugees and asylum seekers.357 Under the Charter, asylum is an autonomous concept, 
which means it must be interpreted in accordance with the fundamental rights 
protected by the Union.  Article 18 therefore “applies in all areas of activity if the 
Union and its Member States that fall into the scope of application under the Union’s 
law.”358 This means that compliance with the Charter is now a requirement for the 
validity and legality of the Union’s secondary legislation.359 Article 18 of the Charter 
provides: 
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules 
of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 
January 1967 relating to the status of refugees in accordance with the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
However, Goodwin-Gill contends that this ‘right to asylum’ does not add 
anything in terms of Member States’ duties, as it merely consolidates asylum rights 
already in existence, and thus remains limited a procedural right to apply for asylum, 
rather than constituting a substantive right to obtain it.360 Nonetheless, the fact that 
Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights can now be invoked directly has 
significantly strengthened the legal guarantees for asylum seekers in the EU.361  This 
has vast potential to open up legal arguments in EU asylum policy, particularly in 
relation to refugees’ access to asylum procedures and protection in the EU.362  
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The Treaty of Lisbon also provides for significant improvements to the 
legislative content of the acquis; the ‘minimum standards,’ which underpin the 
legislative content of the acquis are to be replaced by an advanced level of 
harmonisation encompassing “common procedures for the granting or withdrawing of 
uniform status.”363 The accompanying changes to the legislative process may also 
enhance protection standards as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) will now play a 
role in developing EU asylum law and can now rule directly on its legality.364 The 
prospective impact of the ECJ’s role is, as yet, unclear; the ECJ cites the Refugee 
Convention as the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the protection of 
refugees, but has also expressed support for some of the elements of the Qualification 
Directive, which are not based in the Refugee Convention.365  
Conclusion 
The restrictive legislative content of the EU’s asylum acquis, combined with the 
EU’s extensive use of readmission agreements and exclusionary border control 
mechanisms has resulted in a shrinking asylum space in the EU.  The existing 
legislative content of the CEAS categorically fails to demonstrate a “full and inclusive 
application” of the Refugee Convention.366 The securitised policy and practice of the 
contemporary acquis is fundamentally inconsistent with the protection assumptions of 
international law, which are anchored in the human rights paradigm.367 It has also 
weakened the asylum norm of the international refugee regime.368 The inevitable 
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policy export means that the EU’s incorporation of policies of deterrence and 
deflection into binding supranational instruments has huge implications for global 
refugee protection.369 For example, the ‘safe third country’ notion is now extensively 
applied in Eastern Europe and in Central Asia to deny access to asylum procedures.370  
The EU’s policies of deflection, which effectively externalise responsibility for 
thousands of protection seekers, embody a clear failure to implement the ‘duty to 
protect’ in good faith.  The normative inconsistencies contained in the EU’s 
securitised approach to asylum substantially weaken the EU’s authority in the field of 
human rights.371 The EU’s asylum acquis contains many protection gaps and 
shortcomings, which need to be addressed to ensure the legal coherence of the asylum 
space.  In addition to improving its asylum instruments, the EU needs to resolve the 
policy clashes, between the EU’s external border policy and the protection 
requirements of its common asylum system.372 The following chapter will employ a 
human rights framework of analysis to articulate the minimum substantive 
requirements for a rights-based asylum regime in the EU context, which adheres to 
the protection imperative of international refugee and human rights law.   
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Chapter Three: 
A rights-based approach to protection in the EU context 
Introduction 
 
In the wake of the second World War, Hannah Arendt wrote: “No paradox of 
contemporary politics is filled with a more poignant irony than the discrepancy 
between the efforts of well-meaning idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as 
“inalienable” those human rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most 
prosperous and civilized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves.”373  
The lack of guarantees surrounding refugees’ human rights remains an urgent political 
issue in the 21st century.  In recent years, the international protection regime has 
deteriorated.  Technological advances and geopolitical changes have dramatically 
altered the international protection landscape, as Western states are now able to 
effectively prevent refugee movements and seal off their asylum systems from 
refugee flows.374  
The shrinking global asylum space means that there simply is no scope for 
accommodating the 11 million refugees in need of protection and there are currently 
5.5 million refugees, classified as being in “protracted situations.”375 Many of those in 
protracted exile are housed in makeshift camps, where their daily existence is 
precarious and basic, to the extent that they are unable to meaningfully exercise their 
human rights.376 Their plight is redolent of the desperate situation described by Arendt 
half a century ago. 
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This chapter will examine the minimum substantive requirements for a morally 
defensible refugee policy within the contemporary global context, and propose criteria 
for a refugee policy, which engenders a rights-based approach to protection.  This will 
be used to describe a putative protection framework for the EU, which is consistent 
with the human rights principles of refugee protection.  The EU has the means and the 
capacity to realise this.377  
Delimiting refugee protection  
Approaching refugee protection from a human rights point of view inevitably 
raises the question of delimitation.  Refugees are symptomatic of much greater 
problems and injustices on the global landscape, and represent only a very small 
proportion of the global population of forced migrants, which numbered 43.2 million 
in 2009.378 While the majority of these individuals do not qualify as Convention 
refugees, they nonetheless have a very compelling moral claim to international 
protection on the grounds of human rights.   
In the contemporary global context, the political bias of the refugee definition is 
highly problematic.  There are inherent difficulties in drawing the distinction between  
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, and distinguishing between refugees and economic 
migrants, as political violence and poverty are often interlinked, and refugee 
protection is inextricably linked to the broader issue of global inequality.379 
In many ways, refugee law provides benefits to a somewhat arbitrarily selected 
group of people.  As Jacqueline Bhaba observed: “The institution of asylum… acts as 
a filtering process that is designed to separate eligible from ineligible travellers [and] 
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is constructed to be a strictly limited humanitarian safety valve, permitting only a 
fraction of would-be immigrants, the discrete class of ‘genuine’ refugees, to trump 
immigration restrictions and gain access to the developed world.”380  
The growing numbers of ‘environmental refugees’ are another potent example 
of the blurring distinction between refugees and other displaced populations.381  These 
inconsistencies have ignited a complex legal debate over whether humanitarian 
refugees are recognised under current international law norms.382 The UNHCR now 
provides assistance to other categories of forced migrants, and has highlighted the 
need for the international community to consider such persons to be in need of 
protection.383  However, these additional protection concerns fall beyond the scope of 
this thesis, and do not detract from the EU’s primary protection obligations to 
refugees and asylum seekers.  The duty owed to refugees and asylum seekers is 
especially urgent, as their vulnerability epitomises human insecurity.384 In fact, the 
development of a coherent rights-based asylum policy in the EU would be a 
significant step towards confronting the broader issues of global injustice, and provide 
a rudimentary framework for tackling the expanding protection challenges, which the 
world will inevitably face in the coming century.385  
The sheer scale of the global refugee crisis means that a rights-based vision of 
refugee protection needs to extend beyond the non-refoulement provisions of 
international refugee law, and engage with the human rights needs of the global 
refugee population.  While a comprehensive approach to protection is essential to 
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addressing the plight of those refugees in protracted exile, protection through 
admission must remain the cornerstone of the international refugee regime. 
A rights-based argument for refugee protection 
 The EU’s creation of barriers to its protection space places it in a significant 
normative quandary, as the human rights imperative of refugee protection demands 
that States make an exception to the sovereign prerogative to control access to their 
territory, and ensure that refugees are able to gain admission in order to access 
international protection.  Seyla Benhabib addresses this in The Rights of Others.  She 
emphasises that it is only through admission that refugees are able to exercise their  
human rights.  She argues that for ‘the right to have rights’ to be meaningful, states 
must guarantee first admission rights for refugees.386  
Benhabib’s argument for refugees’ rights to first admission is grounded in 
Kant’s principles of universal hospitality outlined in his 1783 essay “Perpetual 
Peace.” In the Kantian view, the cosmopolitan right of hospitality resides in the 
humanity of each and every person; all human beings have both a right to associate, 
and a right to the common possession of the surface of the Earth.387  Therefore, to 
deny an individual the opportunity to enjoy the land and resources of a territory, when 
it can be done peacefully and without endangering the life and welfare of the original 
inhabitants is not defensible.388 Kant also argued that to refuge a claim to temporary 
residency would be fundamentally unjust, if such a refusal would entail the 
destruction (Untergang) of the other.389  
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Benhabib expands on this version of jus cosmopolitanus, arguing that a rights-
based approach to protection must go beyond temporary residency and also 
incorporate a vision of just membership.390 She contends that refugees must be granted 
a right to political membership, which observes the constraints of non-discrimination 
and right of immigration in due process.391 Her argument specifically addresses the 
siuation of refugees and asylum seekers in the EU, as she illustrates that in the EU the 
‘right to have rights’ remains inexorably attached to EU citizenship status.392 This 
means, to a great extent, refugees in the EU are denied the possibility of exercising 
their human rights.  Their rights of movement, employment and association are 
heavily curtailed, meaning that they remain in a state of ‘exception.’393  
Benhabib maintains that restrictive measures, which prevent asylum seekers 
from accessing international protection, are morally untenable.  She argues that 
“porous borders” are the only way to guarantee the right to admission.394 Her 
argument for porous borders is normative; it places no functional constraints on state 
obligations towards refugees and offers no legal context on which to base this 
approach.  This is a significant weakness, as the pragmatics of asylum policy is 
ultimately essential to its realisation.395 Therefore, Benhabib’s rights-based argument 
does not provide sufficient criteria on which to scaffold a rights-based asylum regime 
in the EU. 
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A rights-based approach to protection within pragmatic constraints: the 
humanitarian principle 
Matthew Gibney argues that in focussing on the morally ideal, normative 
theories consistently fail to describe the ways in which states need to act to address 
morally defensible responses to refugees’ claims.396 In Gibney’s view, creating a 
coherent refugee policy is essentially a moral balancing act between the duty of 
assistance owed to refugees and legitimate state interest.397 He argues that all refugees 
have a moral claim to admission, as “the cost of not entering can be the loss of their 
life or condemnation to a life barely worth living.”398 He underscores the importance 
of upholding the refugee definition found in the Refugee Convention.399 However, he 
argues that the sovereign obligation to grant protection remains in place only until the 
reception capacity of the host state has been reached.400 
Gibney formulates his pragamatic response to refugee protection in The Ethics 
and Politics of Asylum.  He outlines this as a ‘humanitarian principle,’ which 
policymakers may use to guide the development of morally defensible asylum 
policies in the contemporary context.  This approach takes into account the varying 
integrative capacity of states and  compensates for the disproportionate protection 
obligations incurred by certain states, due to their geographical location.401 The 
protection framework outlined in the ‘humanitarian principle’ encompasses both the 
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admission of refugees into state territory, and their subsequent inclusion in the 
‘political culture.’402  
The ‘humanitarian principle’ has global reach.  Gibney argues 
“humanitarianism has no respect for distance; it is owed to all refugees on the basis of 
need alone.”403 Therefore, although those refugees present at the external border of a 
given state have a particularly strong claim to admission, the moral obligation to 
refugees extends to the entire global refugee population.404 In this view, as well as 
ensuring admission for refugees, states are morally obliged to engage with the 
protection claims of all refugees through generous resettlement.405 Measures which 
focus on development issues and addressing root causes are also crucial to a 
humanitarian response to refugees: “working towards a domestic and international 
environment favourable to refugees and asylum seekers is a logical corollary to taking 
humanitarianism seriously.”406 These wider considerations need to guide the 
formulation of a rights-based refugee regime in the EU.   
A rights-based approach to protection in the EU context 
This section will address the ways in which the policies of the CEAS could be 
reformulated, to ensure that the EU facilitates access to its protection space.  A rights-
based asylum regime must exemplify both the sovereign granting of protection 
through admission into its territory, and the permanent integration of an individual 
into the community of the asylum state.  The development of a rights-based approach 
to integration is essential to the creation of a rights-based approach to protection 
within the EU’s asylum space.  Refugees in the EU remain a marginalised category; 
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their freedom of movement is restricted, and in many Member States they do not 
enjoy full political participation, and consequently are able to fully exercise their 
human rights, and risk becoming ghettoised.407 However, the first step in creating a 
viable protection framework for the EU is the creation of an admission policy for 
refugees, which guarantees the principle of non-refoulement.  Therefore, the 
following section will focus exclusively on describing minimum substantive 
requirements to ensure that refugees are able access to international protection in the 
EU.   
Ensuring access to protection 
For the EU to be consistent with its proclaimed commitment to human rights, it 
needs to guarantee the refugees are able to access its protection space.  As Gibney 
argues, entrance policies provide a crucial measure of moral legitimacy.408  The EU’s 
current array of non-entrée mechanisms, which encompass carrier sanctions, stringent 
visa requirements, hard border controls, safe third country mechanisms and 
readmission agreements are indefensible, as they prevent vulnerable individuals from 
accessing protection.  The human rights imperative of refugee protection does not 
preclude the use of migration control measures.  However, it is critical for the EU to 
ensure that all such measures are sensitive to the reality of mixed migration.  In 
essence, the EU must create “borders with doors,” to ensure that refugees are not 
prevented from accessing international protection on its territory.409  
The EU’s practice of enforcing carrier sanctions against those providers 
carrying non-documented migrants poses a clear barrier to refugees, many of whom 
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have good reasons for being without the requisite travel documents.410 Moreover, 
private carriers are not trained in refugee protection and their ad hoc profiling 
practices can be very inadequate, meaning that they inevitably risk refusing passage to 
refugees, who would otherwise be granted international protection upon arrival in the 
EU.411 Instead of engaging officials to enforce stringent visa requirements the EU 
should issue travel documents specifically for refugees, in the form of a humanitarian 
visa or an entry permit.412  
In addition, the EU’s external border controls need to be softened to ensure they 
facilitate admission of refugees spontaneously seeking protection in the EU.  At 
present, the EU’s border management practices, such as the use of interdiction, 
through its engagement of FRONTEX prevents refugees from accessing EU 
territory.413 To prevent this from occurring there is a need to ensure that FRONTEX 
employees have training in identifying persons in need of international protection.414  
Alternatively, FRONTEX operations could ensure that a representative from a human 
rights or refugee agency was present during their operations.415 In the short term, there 
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is also a need for a mechanism to monitor and report on protection failures arising 
from the agency’s activities.416 
The creation of legal channels for refugees to access protection would 
significantly enhance the safety of refugees wishing to claim protection in the EU.  
The current restrictions on access to travel documents simply force many refugees 
into perilous and protracted journeys overland as they seek to gain access 
international protection in the EU.417 The issue of temporary travel documentation 
under a humanitarian visa regime would also significantly reduce the administrative 
costs involved in asylum processing.  Currently a disproportionate percentage of 
resources are spent on determining ‘who’ is a refugee.418 This regime would also need 
to ensure that those refugees with extreme needs, such as women, children, minors, 
and elderly persons were identified before they make the journey to the EU to allow 
them to be processed appropriately upon arrival.  The treatment of minors is of 
particular importance, as a quarter of asylum seekers in the EU are minors.419  
The proposed Protected Entry Procedure (PEP) may provide a means of 
guaranteeing entry for those who qualify for international protection.420 This 
mechanism would allow for asylum claims to be processed in regions of origin.  This 
approach would both facilitate the development of an intra-EU burden-sharing regime 
and present EU Member States with the possibility of limiting access, in the event of 
a mass influx or where their protection capacity was exceeded.  However, this 
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approach must not in any way interfere with the EU’s obligation to uphold the norm 
of non refoulement and process asylum seekers arriving spontaneously at its external 
borders.   
Protection through resettlement  
The moral duty to accept asylum seekers and the duty to engage in international 
burden-sharing arrangements are intertwined.  Therefore, in addition to ensuring that 
refugees can access international protection on its territory, a rights-based approach to 
protection would see the EU engage in global burden-sharing measures, which 
address the vast imbalances in refugee distribution across the global protection 
landscape.  Currently developing nations support upwards of 80% of the world’s 
refugees.421 These countries often lack the means to provide effective protection, and, 
in some cases, these overburdened states employ exclusionary and deterrent policies 
towards refugees to incite them to return home or seek protection elsewhere.422  
 Resettlement programmes would allow the EU to ensure that it assumes 
responsibility for a number of the world’s refugee commensurate with its protection 
capacity.  As the UNHCR has noted, resettlement is absolutely vital to solving 
protracted situations.423 The absolute number of refugees resettled in the EU is far less 
than its protection capacity; in 2009, the EU received fewer than 7 per cent of the total 
global offshore refugees.424 At present only ten Member States participate annually in 
resettlement.425 There is scope for the EU’s Resettlement programme to be 
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significantly expanded.  The foundations for an EU-wide scheme may be found in the 
Söderkoping Process, which allows participating countries to engage in Resettlement 
on a voluntary basis.426  
The EU’s moves towards developing a comprehensive settlement scheme are in 
their infancy, as an EU approach to resettlement was first addressed in the 
Commission’s 2008 policy plan on asylum.427 The Commission describes its 
proposals for increased Resettlement as a way to “meet the protection needs of 
refugees in third countries and to show solidarity with third countries of first 
asylum.”428  This move towards Resettlement may represent a promising step towards 
a more holistic approach to refugee protection in the EU.  Nonetheless, as Erika Feller 
has cautioned: “Asylum and resettlement are two distinct and separate possibilities.  It 
is therefore critical to the integrity of the international protection system that 
resettlement processing and national asylum systems work in tandem, not against 
each other.”429 The development of a comprehensive approach to resettlement is a key 
component of ensuring that the EU’s refugee policies are consistent with fundamental 
human rights.  It offers the possibility of extending protection to the most vulnerable 
refugees, who would otherwise remain in their region of origin.  However, an 
expansion of the EU’s Resettlement programme must occur in parallel with the 
development of measures to ensure that asylum seekers are able to spontaneously 
access protection in the EU.   
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Providing protection in regions of origin 
A further possibility for providing human rights guarantees for refugees may be 
found in the creation of programmes to provide protection to refugees in their regions 
of origin.  This approach to international protection represents a significant change of 
focus from an international protection regime based on the Refugee Convention.430  It 
constitutes a fundamental departure from the traditional system of refugee protection 
based on the individual responsibility of each asylum country.431  The international 
regulatory framework surrounding these initiatives is relatively underdeveloped, and 
the sparse normative and legal framework leaves much up to state discretion.432 
However, it has the potential to significantly enhance global refugee protection 
landscape.  As Alexander Betts argues, the complexity of migration in the 
contemporary global context means that this approach may be the best way to open up 
protection space for refugees.433 Protection capacity building must be approached with 
a good faith commitment, to ensure that refugees’ rights are genuinely enhanced by 
such measures.434 
The EU’s involvement in schemes, which enhance the protection capacity of 
third countries inevitably raises the question of conflict of interest.  Emek Uçarer 
argues that the EU has strategically employed such policies to create a “buffer zone” 
around the EU “without going much beyond instrumental reference to assistance and 
burden-sharing.”435 Christina Boswell has also observed that  Member States “have an 
interest in strengthening refugee protection in the countries around them to try and 
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ensure that more people will not feel impelled to continue moving further north or 
west in search of asylum.”436 Boswell addresses the inconsistencies inherent to the 
EU’s approach, as it simultaneously acknowledges the destabilising effects of 
refugees in developing countries and insists that they remain there.437  
Some of the EU’s initiatives to enhance protection in neighbouring countries 
have had a positive impact on refugees’ rights.  For example, in recent years the EU 
has improved asylum and refugee policy in parts of the European Neighbourhood.438 
However, there have been other instances where the result has been the creation of de 
facto border controls in third countries, to the detriment of refugees’ human rights.  
For example, the EU’s cooperation with Libya has not translated into improved 
conditions for refugees; instead it has focused heavily on developing border control 
and surveillance, which has precipitated refoulements.439  
Since 2005, the EU has been pursuing the development of Regional Protection 
Programmes (RPPs) under the direction of the Commission, to enhance the reception 
capacity of third countries so that they become providers of ‘effective protection.’440 
This improves protection prospects for the many refugees who lack the means to 
make the long journey to the EU, and also removes the incentives for refugees to 
resort to people smugglers as a means of accessing protection.441 However, while 
RPPs seek to inject protection instead of concentrating on the management of 
migration flows, the extent to which these measures effect and overall improvement 
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for the human rights of refugees need to be evaluated.442  Gregor Noll argues that 
onshore processing provides superior protection guarantees for protection seekers, as 
it is subject to judicial scrutiny.443  
The EU’s engagement in protection in regions of origin holds much potential 
for enhancing the global protection space.  However the creation of regional 
protection initiatives is only morally defensible if they serve to complement a rights-
based asylum regime in the EU; such measures cannot replace the EU’s primary duty 
to ensure that refugees are able to access protection on its own territory.  The EU’s 
practice of limiting its own protection responsibilities seriously undermines the 
integrity of its involvement in enhancing protection in regions of origin.  Moreover, 
because the EU is a locus of policy export, its own policies will ultimately have the 
greatest impact on the international protection regime.444  The inevitable transfer of 
the EU’s policies of deterrence and deflection will undermine any efforts to construct 
rights-based regional protection initiatives in third countries.  For example, Tanzania 
has explicitly used the asylum control practices of the European Union as a 
justification for its own restrictive practices towards Burundian refugees.445 
Conclusion 
Although, the securitised rhetoric surrounding asylum in the EU has fuelled the 
misperception that the EU’s asylum space is overburdened, the asylum demands on 
the EU are relatively small.  As a point of comparison, the 246,000 asylum claims in 
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the EU in 2009 is equivalent to the number of Somali refugees currently housed in the 
Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya.446  The EU in fact has the means and the capacity to 
provide long-term protection within the European Union to those who are in need of 
it.447  To ensure that its refugee policies reflect the values of fundamental human 
rights, the EU needs to ensure that its asylum space is accessible.  This demands 
embedding international protection guarantees across the full spectrum of its 
migration control mechanisms, as well as creating legal channels for refugees to 
spontaneously access its protection space.  Further to this, the EU must 
comprehensively engage in resettlement programmes, which specifically addresses 
the plight of those refugees in protracted exile.  By implementing these parallel 
avenues to its own protection area, the EU will lay the foundations for the 
development of a holistic approach to asylum, which also encompasses extraterritorial 
protection initiatives.  This will see the creation of a morally defensive refugee 
regime, in which the EU assumes responsibility for a proportion of the global refugee 
population, commensurate with its protection capacity, and in keeping with 
fundamental human rights values.  The combined effect of these actions will 
significantly enhance the global asylum regime.  However, these mechanisms will 
only be effective if they complement a functioning ‘single asylum space.’  There are 
significant flaws in the EU’s common asylum system, which need to be overcome for 
the EU’s single protection area to be viable.  The following chapter will address the 
urgent need for consistent and full implementation of the supranational asylum 
provisions across EU Member States.  It will also illustrate the necessity for an intra-
EU burden-sharing mechanism, to relieve the disproportionate asylum pressure 
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currently faced by certain Member States.  These changes are essential to the 
operability of the EU as a single protection area, and ultimately to the EU’s ability to 
make a meaningful contribution to refugee protection.   
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Chapter 4:  
Towards a ‘Single Asylum Space’? 
Introduction 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is projected to be fully 
operational by 2012.448 This is a very ambitious deadline.  At present, the CEAS is far 
from complete.  The treatment of asylum seekers and the final outcome of asylum 
applications vary dramatically throughout the EU.449 The lack of cohesion within the 
EU’s asylum space has led the ECRE to describe it as an “asylum lottery.”450  This is 
irreconcilable with the ‘one chance only principle,’ on which the allocation of asylum 
seekers in the EU’s asylum system is premised.  The distribution of asylum seekers 
amongst Member States is also highly unequal and certain Member States incur 
disproportionately high asylum costs.451 The excessive asylum burden incurred by 
some Member States significantly impairs their capacity to provide effective 
protection.  This wholly undermines the notion of a ‘single asylum space.’  
Ultimately, the viability of the EU’s common asylum system hinges on the 
development of a comprehensive intra-EU burden sharing system, which takes into 
account the varying reception capacities of individual Member States and ensures that 
humanitarian obligations are equally distributed throughout the Union. 
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The variable geometry of ‘Fortress Europe’ 
The variance in recognition rates amongst similar categories of asylum seekers 
across the EU reveals the extent that asylum policy harmonisation has not been 
achieved.452  For example, the Member State receiving the largest number of Afghani 
asylum applications had a recognition rate of 44%, while the recognition rate in the 
country receiving the second largest number of applications was just 1%.453 In recent 
years the disparity in recognition rates throughout EU Member States has increased.454  
This marked divergence in practices and standards across Member States is, to a 
large extent a consequence of gaps in the EU’s asylum legislation.  The negotiation of 
common instruments was characterised by lowest common denominator bargaining, 
in which minimum standards prevailed.455  These cost-benefit calculations have 
significantly impaired the functionality of the EU’s asylum acquis.456  The flexibility 
embedded in the supranational instruments is now seriously impairing the functioning 
of the EU’s common asylum system.  For example, the minimum standards contained 
in the Qualification Directive allow for wide divergence in practice amongst Member 
States, which inevitably leads to a variance in recognition rates.457 Similarly, the 
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Reception Directive leaves many details up to the discretion of Member States, which 
allows for inconsistencies.458  
However, the striking variations in recognition rates also stem from the fact that 
many Member States have simply neglected to transpose the supranational provisions 
into their domestic practice.459 To achieve a functioning common European asylum 
system, there is a need for both an upgrade of the existing legislative framework to 
provide for higher common standards of protection and an improvement in practical 
cooperation to ensure the implementation of these measures.460 Recent developments 
indicate a growing tendency for Member States to focus on operational coordination 
of asylum measures in lieu of a harmonised approach.461 This practice may amplify 
existing disparities in Member State practice. 
The European Asylum Support Office (EASO)462 has been developed as a 
regulatory agency to assist in the synchronisation of asylum practice across the EU.  
This agency is to be based in Malta, and will become operational in June 2011.  It 
aims to ensure a common EU asylum procedure through practical cooperation on 
asylum, with a focus on the dissemination of best practice.463 EASO is also intended 
to support EU Member States whose asylum and reception systems are under 
particular pressure due to large number of asylum applications.  In the short term, 
EASO will focus on reception and qualification.  However in 2013, pending an 
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evaluation, it may play a role in monitoring burden-sharing arrangements, and 
become involved in intra-EU transfer of asylum seekers.464  
EASO’s role will be limited to coordination; the agency has no decision-making 
power.  Some commentators caution that in focusing on operational coordination, 
EASO will precipitate a departure from the goal of deeper harmonisation.465  As Carl 
Levy observes that EASO follows in the tradition of “supranational 
intergovernmentalism,” and is therefore unlikely to effective in ensuring 
implementation or enhancing asylum capacity building.466  ECRE and the UNHCR 
also caution that the office will only be able to enhance the efficiency of the CEAS as 
long as it is well resourced, operationally transparent and democratically 
accountable.467 The UNHCR has suggested that, in addition to the asylum support 
office, the EU should create an asylum authority and a EU asylum court to ensure that 
the acquis is consistently implemented.468 Barry Junker has also highlighted the need 
for a wholly centralised asylum system in the EU, with a centralised office and 
uniform asylum laws.469  
The Dublin Regulation: entrenching imbalances? 
It is clear that the EU urgently needs to address the inconsistencies in asylum 
reception and recognition, which undermine the viability of its common asylum 
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system.  The Dublin Regulation,470 which effectively determines the distribution of 
asylum seekers in the EU, is highly problematic on a number of fronts.  Its system of 
allocation, which generally places responsibility for an asylum seeker with the 
Member State of first entry, is premised on the equivalent treatment of asylum seekers 
in all EU Member States.  The current variances in reception conditions and asylum 
assessments across the ‘single asylum space’ potentially leave refugees exposed to 
refoulement.471  
The Dublin Regulation codifies the ‘once chance only’ principle, which was 
designed to solve the problem of ‘refugees in orbit’ within the EU and to guarantee 
that each asylum application would be processed.472 However, it has emphatically 
failed to achieve this.  Many Member States have failed to implement the Dublin 
Regulation properly, which has led to cases of applicants unjustifiably being denied 
access to asylum procedures in the responsible state.473  In some cases, the return 
mechanism under the Regulation prevents applicants from receiving a substantive 
assessment of their claims.474  As Madeleine Garlick has observed, the Dublin 
Regulation has entrenched the problem of ‘refugees in orbit’:  “some asylum seekers, 
under the combined effect of Dublin II within the EU and ‘safe third country’ rules 
for third countries, are being shifted from one state to another in which their claims 
are never properly examined.”475  
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Furthermore, the Regulation works against the overarching objective of a 
common asylum system, as it does not promote intra-EU solidarity.476   Its system of 
allocation entrenches the inherent geographical imbalances of the EU’s asylum space.  
The Dublin system effectively insulates many northern and western European 
countries from protection obligations, as they are generally reached by overland 
journeys, meaning that the majority of asylum seekers presenting on their territory 
have passed through the territory of another Member State en route.477 This inevitably 
places the Southern and Eastern Member States Member States at a significant 
disadvantage, as their geographic location means that they inevitably incur 
responsibility for a greater number of refugees.478 The Dublin Regulation contains no 
compensatory mechanism to allow for the disproportionate protection obligations 
inevitably incurred by certain Member States.   
The intrinsic flaws in the Dublin mechanism are currently being demonstrated 
in the return of asylum seekers to Greece, where its overburdened and under-
resourced asylum system is incapable of providing adequate protection standards.  
Greece currently has 52,000 asylum cases pending.479 As they await processing, these 
people are being detained in critically crowded conditions.480 Asylum seekers 
claiming international protection in Greece face serious difficulties in accessing the 
asylum system and registering a claim in the first instance.  Once lodged, their claims 
risk being unfairly examined.  For asylum seekers in Greece there is a dire lack of the 
requisite procedural safeguards to ensure the correct identification of those in need of 
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international protection, and to prevent violation of the principle of non-
refoulement.481  
In September 2010, UNHCR described the situation in Greece as a 
“humanitarian crisis,” and urged other EU Member States not to initiate asylum 
transfers back to Greece.482 The crisis situation in Greece has led the constitutional 
courts of a number of other Member States to prohibit returns of asylum seekers to 
Greece and the European Court of Human Rights has issued stays of return in 
numerous cases pending its examination of the situation.483 There are a series of cases 
pending before the European Court of Human Rights regarding the risk of breaches of 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights484 through actual or proposed 
transfers from other member states to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.485 At the 
time of writing, Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands had suspended transfers to 
Greece.486  
The situation in Greece highlights the imperative for human rights safeguards to 
be included in the Dublin Regulation.  It demonstrates that the Dublin Regulation 
needs to be tempered with a mechanism to suspend transfers where a Member State 
has demonstrably reached its protection capacity, or is otherwise failing to provide 
effective protection.  The imbalanced system of allocation of the Dublin Regulation 
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embodies the politics of deflection, which is inherent to the securitised approach to 
asylum in the EU.   
These deflective dynamics are also highly visible in the accession process.  At 
present, the principal aim is to make candidate states an asylum destination, as raising 
the protection standards in accession countries substantially increases the pool of 
states to which asylum seekers can be returned.487 The requirements imposed on the 
EU’s peripheral southern and eastern members within the framework of successive 
enlargement processes has led acceding States to implement asylum policies that 
outstrip their protection capacity.488  The 2004 and 2007 Enlargement processes have 
expanded the EU to the extent that the external border of the Union is now contiguous 
with countries, which generate a large number of the world’s refugees.489 These newer 
Member States are in many cases unable to cope with the pressure on their newly 
created asylum systems.490  For example, Eastern European Member States lack 
adequate reception arrangements and procedural safeguards.491 The dynamics of 
burden shifting is again being evidenced in the pre-accession process in the Western 
Balkans, where their asylum systems are being improved, with the explicit aim of 
making them a region of destination for asylum seekers, instead of transit countries.492 
This phenomenon of burden shifting through the Enlargement process further 
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highlights the need for a reorientation of the deflective approach to asylum, which 
characterises intra-EU dynamics.   
Intra-EU burden-sharing 
As the CEAS has been developed, there have been repeated references to 
solidarity amongst Member States.  However, Member States have been reluctant to 
commit to a comprehensive approach to intra-EU burden sharing, which would 
provide a tangible demonstration of solidarity.493 In recent years it has become clear 
that the development of a responsibility sharing mechanism is critical to the 
functioning of the EU’s common asylum system.  At present, the share of asylum 
spending in relation to GDP varies dramatically across Member States. A recent 
report demonstrated that asylum costs in Malta are a thousand times greater than in 
Portugal.494  
The imperative of developing an intra-EU burden sharing mechanism was 
addressed in the 2008 European Policy Plan on Immigration and Asylum.  The 
Stockholm Programme also places an emphasis on increasing solidarity and burden 
sharing within the EU.  However, a consensus has yet to be reached on which costs 
should be shared at the European level, and the current proposals being considered by 
the EU are not sufficiently comprehensive to equalise the asylum burden across 
Member States.495 
An intra-EU burden-sharing regime may take many forms.  Gregor Noll has 
categorised asylum burden sharing into three different forms: physical burden-
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sharing; financial burden-sharing, and harmonisation of asylum policy.496 In the EU, 
the nascent burden-sharing initiatives have focussed on the two latter options.  EU 
level asylum policy harmonisation emerged from a desire to address the unequal 
distribution of asylum seekers across the Union.497 It has also been shown that while 
restrictive policy may deter asylum seekers, this is only one factor in an asylum 
seeker’s decision-making process, and may have less of an impact on asylum numbers 
than previously thought.498 
The European Refugee Fund (ERF) represents a form of financial burden-
sharing to compensate Member States who incur a greater asylum burden.499  The 
fund was initially created in September 2000 in response to the Yugoslav crisis.500 
The most recent edition, ERF III, was established in 2008, “to demonstrate solidarity 
between Member States by achieving a balance in the efforts made by those Member 
States.”501 While this fund provides financial incentives for resettlement, its operating 
budget is insufficient to the task of equalising the asylum burden in the EU.502  For the 
ERF to be a true burden-sharing instrument, it needs to allocate funds on relative, 
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rather than absolute numbers of protection seekers to allow for the varying protection 
capacity of Member States, depending on their size and economic output.503  
 In general, provisions for intra-EU burden sharing have focussed on situations 
of temporary mass influxes of refugees and have remained restricted to the context of 
temporary protection.  The Temporary Protection Directive504 provides for transfers, 
which amount to physical burden sharing, although these putative arrangements are 
based on the principle of ‘double voluntarism,’ which means that the agreement of 
both the receiving state and the refugees is required before protection seekers can be 
moved from one country to another.505 The Commission’s proposal for temporary 
suspension of transfers under the Dublin Regulation, and the potential for EASO to 
facilitate a voluntary redistribution of asylum seekers also amount to measures 
grounded in physical burden-sharing.506 
However, Eiko Thielemann has argued that the EU clearly needs a vastly 
broader burden-sharing regime than that which currently exists.507 Thielemann 
describes such an approach thus: “[a]n equitable burden sharing regime will require 
that Member States commit to a collective decision making process, which promotes 
the well being of others, even where this occurs at significant cost to themselves.”508 
In his discussion of what form an intra-EU burden-sharing solution might take, 
Thielemann highlights the need to consider Member States’ reception capacity in 
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relative, rather than absolute numbers, using a per capita calculation.509 He suggests 
the development of a mechanism, which allows both for variances in the number of 
asylum applications received in Member States, and the varying ability of Member 
States to manage their caseloads.  This may involve redistribution mechanisms to 
equalise numbers or asylum seekers in respective Member States, or it may use a 
compensatory logic, based on financial considerations.510 
A recent study on the feasibility of burden-sharing mechanisms in the EU 
concluded that the most effective way to equalise asylum costs throughout the EU 
would be to create a system for the physical relocation of asylum seekers throughout 
Member States.511  Physical burden-sharing raises some critical fundamental human 
rights considerations.  ECRE has argued that allocation of asylum seekers must reflect 
a meaningful connection between the refugee and the host state, or else the Member 
State of destination must be left to the subjective choice of the refugee.512  
Gregor Noll argues that intra-EU burden sharing would maximise the protection 
capacity of the EU by allowing existing resources to be fully exploited.513  However, 
he cautions that discussions surrounding burden-sharing are inherently problematic as 
they risk obscuring the significant benefits that refugees bring to the host state.514 
The need for a comprehensive approach to burden-sharing in the EU is clear.  
Equalising the asylum burden across Member States would mitigate the danger of 
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protection failures that result from overburdened asylum systems, such as in Greece. 
It would therefore translate into a significant advancement in protection standards 
across the ‘single asylum space.’  The realisation of an intra-EU burden-sharing 
mechanism will require both a considerable demonstration of solidarity, and the 
development of asylum legislation, which departs from the cost-benefit approach, 
which has hitherto influenced the development of the main instruments of EU asylum 
policy.  The current proposals for recasting the main directives contain some positive 
steps towards achieving this aim.  However, harmonised asylum instruments based on 
common protection standards would provide the ideal platform on which to base an 
intra-EU burden-sharing mechanism.  The institutional changes brought about by the 
Treaty of Lisbon may facilitate such a further legislative phase.   
Conclusion 
For the Common European Asylum System to be a viable project, the EU must 
urgently address the normative and operational inconsistencies, which prevent its 
asylum system from fulfilling its protection objectives.  The EU faces the dual 
challenges of aligning its supranational asylum instruments with the normative 
demands of international refugee law, and ensuring that these provisions are 
implemented consistently across the EU.  As part of ensuring consistent practice 
across its asylum space, the EU needs to develop an intra-EU burden-sharing scheme, 
which proportionally allocates protection responsibility amongst Member States.  For 
burden sharing to succeed in the EU, compliance structures must be in place to ensure 
that asylum practice is consistent throughout the EU.  It is as yet unclear whether the 
newly created EASO will be sufficient to the task.  The ratification of the Treaty of 
Lisbon has significantly enhanced the prospects of the EU completing the requisite 
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legislative changes.  It opens the possibility for a new phase of legislative 
harmonisation for the acquis, which would enhance refugees’ rights.515 However, it 
remains in question whether the EU will be able to capitalise on the political 
momentum surrounding the Treaty of Lisbon and realise the advanced level of 
legislative harmonisation necessary for a fully functioning common asylum system.  
The final chapter will address the scope for the realisation of a fully operational EU 
rights-based asylum system in the post-Lisbon context. 
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Chapter 5:  
The CEAS in the post-Lisbon environment: challenges ahead 
The fundamental challenge in creating a robust refugee policy lies in balancing 
the tension between the universalist imperative to admit protection seekers and the 
sovereign prerogative of states to control access to their territory.  As Guy Goodwin-
Gill has observed: “The art is to translate the rhetoric of human rights protection into 
a working reality that is commensurate with human dignity, compatible with 
international obligations and consistent with the rule of law.”516 The EU has so far 
emphatically failed to achieve this.   
This examination of the protection failings of the EU’s common asylum system 
has highlighted the urgent need for the EU to ensure that its refugee regime is 
grounded in fundamental human rights values.  The principal barrier to the realisation 
of a rights-based Common European Asylum System is the security paradigm, which 
informs EU asylum policymaking.  The analysis of the securitisation of asylum in the 
EU presented in the previous chapters demonstrates how trans-governmental 
decision-making structures continue to allow refugees to be considered as an 
exceptional category.  It demonstrates how this framing has translated into 
supranational asylum legislation, which abjectly fails to provide adequate protection 
safeguards for protection seekers in the EU.  Although the EU now has binding 
supranational legislation in place to cover the full spectrum of its asylum system, the 
EU’s asylum acquis contains significant protection gaps.  Moreover, the EU’s 
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indiscriminate use of migration control mechanisms and border controls runs counter 
to the good faith requirements of refuge protection. 
The human rights framework of analysis used in this thesis has revealed the 
complexity of the questions involved in developing a fair and humane approach to 
refugee protection in the EU.  It shows that a rights-based approach to protection in 
the EU context demands a multi-dimensional solution, one which extends beyond the 
refugee protection provisions of the Refugee Convention, and which also 
encompasses protection in regions of origin.  The EU has the potential to develop a 
comprehensive solution to refugee protection, which engages with the global refugee 
crisis.  This would involve the development of measures to facilitate refugees’ access 
to Europe, as well as a significant expansion of resettlement programmes to provide 
protection for those refugees in protracted situations.  It would also encompass an 
engagement with the root causes of refugee generation through development 
assistance.  This would translate into a stronger international role for the EU.   
The global ‘export value’ of EU policies means that the EU practice has 
substantially weakened the asylum norm of the global protection regime.  Deflective 
mechanisms used in the EU are adopted and adapted by other states with the 
justification that they are used in Europe.  Elements of the EU acquis have found their 
way to the Meroscur states of Latin America, even though these states receive 
relatively few asylum claims.517 
In the first instance, the EU needs to ensure that its own asylum regime is 
consistent with the protection imperative of international refugee and human rights 
law, and that these supranational provisions are consistenly implemented across the 
EU.  To achieve this, the EU needs to fully develop supranational asylum legislation, 
                                                
517 Nicholson, “Challenges to Forging a Common European Asylum System in Line with International 
Obligations,” 532-3. 
107 
which guarantees a full and fair examination of asylum claims.  The recasting of the 
Qualification Directive and the Procedures Directive, the planned Resettlement 
Programme and the Creation of a European Asylum Support Office represent the 
beginnings of such a shift.  A further legislative stage will be necessary to ensure that 
the EU’s asylum acquis is fully consistent with the principles of refugee protection.   
Furthermore, the EU needs to ensure that its asylum space is accessible.  
Protection guarantees must be  embedded across its entire spectrum of migration 
control and security mechanisms.  For example, EU border policy must be developed 
with consideration for the indirect impact it will have on the EU’s asylum system.518 
Resettlement programmes also need to be expanded to provide protection for those 
refugees in protracted situation as well as engaging with the root causes of refugee 
generation. There is also scope for the development of measures, such as an 
humanitarian visa regime, to facilitate refugees’ access to international protection in 
the EU. 
The recent ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon has come at an auspicious 
moment in the development of the Common European Asylum System.  It coincides 
with the beginning of the AFSJ’s new multi-annual programme under the Stockholm 
Programme.  The changes to the decision-making process give the Union the capacity 
to fully harmonise asylum measures and enhance relevant legislation.  The treaty sets 
an advanced level of harmonisation encompassing “common procedures for the 
granting or withdrawing of uniform status” as an explicit goal.519 The European Court 
of Justice can now rule directly on the legality of the EU’s asylum legislation.520 The 
Treaty of Lisbon represents a unique opportunity to realign the acquis of the Common 
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European Asylum System with the values of fundamental rights.521 It provides the 
institutional scaffolding for the overhaul of the EU’s asylum legislation.  The formal 
recognition of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Refugee 
Convention provides the foundations from which to build  “a true common area of 
protection and solidarity based on respect for human rights, high standards of 
protection and a general improvement in the quality of national systems.”522  
There remains however, a caveat:  the EU’s capacity to realise a truly common, 
coherent and concerted asylum system depends entirely on the political will of 
Member States.  There are some indications that Member States do not possess the 
political will to to fully complete the project of a common asylum system, and are 
opting for operational coordination, instead of uniform procedures.523 There have been 
instances of select groups of Member States engaging in trans-national arrangements 
such as the Treaty of Prüm,524 with the aim of achieving enhanced cooperation.525 This 
kind of trans-governmental cooperation calls into question whether Member States 
have a common approach to asylum as their overarching goal.526 The Treaty of Lisbon 
allows for this fragmented approach.  It allows for increased flexibility in the form of 
opt-outs, enhanced cooperation, and emergency brakes.527 This may actually amplify 
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the disparities within the EU’s asylum system and preclude the realisation of a fully 
functioning CEAS.528  
Nonetheless, the possibility for developing an EU asylum system which is 
accessible, equitable, and effective has been significantly enhanced by the ratification 
of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The EU now has refugee protection principles enshrined in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the Lisbon Treaty.  The treaty-based 
architecture significantly strengthens the legal foundations of the common EU asylum 
policy.529 The challenge now is to move beyond rhetoric and provide human rights 
guarantees for refugees, both in the common legislation and in practice.  Above all, 
this demands the eradication of the trans-governmental security frame, which 
continues to undermine the common approach to asylum in the EU. 
This is a critical moment for the global institution of refugee protection.  
Although the absolute numbers of asylum seekers remain stable, there are fewer and 
fewer avenues to asylum for those seeking international protection.530 A failure to 
resolve the global refugee crisis will have far reaching global implications for human 
security, economic security and political security on a global scale.531 The EU’s 
policies of deflection and deterrence, which seek to externalise the responsibility to 
protect, have badly damaged its image on the world stage, and weakened the global 
system of protection.  Yet, the EU has the potential to lead the world in developing 
innovative protection tools, which ensure that refugees have access to human rights 
protection.  The Treaty of Lisbon offers a chance for the EU to put its fundamental 
human rights principles into practice, and ensure that its common approach to asylum 
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reflects the liberal universal values contained in the Refugee Convention.  It is 
essential that the EU use this occasion to reclaim its historical legacy, and develop a 
rights-based supranational protection regime, which substantially contributes to an 
equitable global system of refugee protection. 
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